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1 Pervasive Developmental Disorder-Not Otherwise
diagnostic category used if the severity of the signs and
level required for full autism or Asperger syndrome.Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) are developmental disorders which are thought primarily to affect
social functioning. However, there is now a growing body of evidence that unusual sensory processing
is at least a concomitant and possibly the cause of many of the behavioural signs and symptoms of
ASD. A comprehensive and critical review of the phenomenological, empirical, neuroscientiﬁc and theo-
retical literature pertaining to visual processing in ASD is presented, along with a brief justiﬁcation of a
new theory which may help to explain some of the data, and link it with other current hypotheses about
the genetic and neural aetiologies of this enigmatic condition.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Autism is a developmental disorder characterized by difﬁculties
with social interaction, social communication and an unusually re-
stricted range of behaviours and interests (Frith, 2003). A diagnosis
of autism also requires a clinically signiﬁcant delay in language
development before the age of 3 years. Asperger Syndrome has
similar signs and symptoms to autism except without the language
delay. Together (with PDD-NOS)1 these two diagnostic groups have
come to be known as Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), although
there is ongoing controversy about how distinct they really are
(see Volkmar, State, & Klin, 2009).
A second controversy concerns whether or not the prevalence of
ASDs (about 1% in western countries) is increasing (Charles, Car-
penter, Jenner, & Nicholas, 2008). The prevalence controversy is
complicated by two factors: the historical changes in diagnostic
criteria (see below) and the continuing debate over the causes of
ASDs. Concerning the latter, those who favour a genetic cause point
to the strong evidence for a genetic component in the aetiology of
ASD: chieﬂy the male/female differences in prevalence (about a
factor of 4 higher in males) and the data indicating that ASD is
more prevalent in monozygotic than dyzygotic twins (Bailey
et al., 1995; Baron-Cohen, 2003; Bourgeron, 2008). If the cause is
genetic (rather than epigenetic) then any increase in prevalence
must result from improved diagnosis. An environmental explana-
tion centres on a genuine increase in the numbers of those who
have ASD arising from environmental stressors, such as pollution,ll rights reserved.
s).
Speciﬁed (PDD-NOS) is the
symptoms are just below thediet or lifestyle (see Altevogt, Hanson, & Leshner, 2008; Rutter,
2009; Thornton, 2006). It is likely that both genetic and environ-
mental factors contribute to the aetiology of ASDs, although a
number of genetic disorders can result in similar symptoms (e.g.
Fragile-X, Tuberous Sclerosis: see Gillberg & Coleman, 2000, for
more).
2. The diagnosis of ASDs
The signs and symptoms of ASD amenable to diagnosis are al-
most entirely behavioural, so a large variety of diagnostic instru-
ments are based on either the direct or indirect observation of
individual behaviour. These include the Autism Diagnostic Inter-
view (ADI; Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994), the Autism Diagnostic
Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000), the Developmen-
tal, Dimensional and Diagnostic Interview (3Di; Skuse et al.,
2004) and the Diagnostic Interview for Social and Communication
Disorders (DISCO; Leekam, Libby, Wing, Gould, & Taylor, 2002).
Variants of these tests are used depending on the age and/or lan-
guage level of the individual concerned. Diagnostic instruments
also vary in the way that they gather data. Most instruments in-
clude a history-taking procedure, particularly important for deter-
mining early language development (e.g. ADI). However, others
rely largely on interviewing the individual concerned and/or
observing them directly (e.g. ADOS). It is generally thought that,
for research purposes, a directly observed diagnosis is more reli-
able because it does not utilize third-party information. However,
the most reliable diagnoses probably involve a combination of ap-
proaches (e.g. ADI together with ADOS). Within a clinical context
the validity of research is frequently judged on the method and
source of diagnosis. Obtaining such reliable diagnoses requires at
the very least specialist training, and probably collaboration with
clinical partners. In many studies that we will consider the ASD
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cialists” or may even rely solely on parental report of previous
diagnosis.2 Others will specify the use of standard diagnostic crite-
ria, such as DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) or
ICD-10 (World Health Organisation, 1993). Sometimes further
checks will be made using screening instruments, either self-report
questionnaires such as the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001b), or third-
party questionnaires, such as the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS;
Constantino et al., 2003). We shall try to assess the reliability of diag-
noses used, whilst bearing in mind that important insights into vi-
sual functioning in ASD may still be obtained even when the ‘‘gold
standard” of diagnosis is not (Dover & Le Couteur, 2007; McClure
& Le Couteur, 2007). Note also that, for a study to be speciﬁc to
ASD, the known genetic syndromes which have similar symptom
proﬁles to ASD should be explicitly ruled out, as, ideally, should
other forms of learning disability or neuropathology.3. Other general issues with research into ASDs
The commonest design for an experiment in this area is to
source a population of individuals with ASD and compare their
performance with a control group, which may be ‘‘typical” of the
general population, or be drawn from another clinical population,
such as individuals with Attention Deﬁcit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD) or Down’s syndrome. Normally these populations are
‘‘matched”, using IQ (verbal (VIQ), non-verbal (NVIQ) or full-scale
(FSIQ)), chronological age (CA) or mental age (MA), with the choice
depending upon the task concerned, such as whether or not it
makes high demands on language and whether performance might
be more inﬂuenced by physical maturation or cognitive ability.
These issues are typical of those encountered in clinical research,
but there are some added difﬁculties when dealing with ASD. First,
there is the question of which part of the autism spectrum to tar-
get. Most studies use people with either ‘‘high-functioning” autism
(HFA), or Asperger Syndrome (AS) who generally have average, or
even above-average, IQ and do not require an additional learn-
ing-disabled control group for comparison. However, because the
HFA/AS group will also have less profound symptoms, any perfor-
mance differences between this group and controls will tend to be
smaller. If a more severely affected autism group is chosen then a
learning-disabled control group may be required, introducing
problems of how to convey instructions, maintain participant
attention and record experimental responses. Furthermore, even
taking a population that is close in terms of IQ, age and position
on the autism spectrum does not guarantee homogeneity within
the population. It is often suggested (only half jokingly) that the
heterogeneity of performance in a given task is the only reliable
difference between data obtained from an ASD and a typical con-
trol population! Finally, given that social reticence and mainte-
nance of routine is one of the symptoms of ASD it can be hard to
recruit volunteers. Thus, obtaining reliable and statistically signif-
icant differences between ASD and control populations can be a
major challenge. Added to this is the care with which task design
must be undertaken. It is hard to determine whether poor perfor-
mance on a task is due to an ASD-speciﬁc performance deﬁcit, or
whether there is a more generalised issue, such as attention con-
trol or a misunderstanding of the task instructions. Another poten-
tial factor is the use of medication by the ASD group, particularly in2 Given the signiﬁcant changes in diagnostic criteria in the years since ASD was ﬁrst
described, very careful attention should be paid to the group characterization in any
studies which pre-date publication of DSM-IV in 1994. See Hincha-Ownby (2008) for
an overview of these changes. Note also that these criteria will themselves shortly be
updated when DSM-V is published (see American Psychiatric Association web-site for
the latest developments: http://www.psych.org).adults. The most convincing studies demonstrate differential per-
formance on very similar tasks where these collateral demands
are the same (see Bertone & Faubert, 2006; Burack, Iarocci, Flana-
gan, & Bowler, 2004; Jarrold & Brock, 2004).
A ﬁnal important issue to consider is the fact that ASD is a
developmental disorder, the signs and symptoms of which can
change dramatically over time in a given individual (Fecteau, Mot-
tron, Berthiaume, & Burack, 2003). Hence, what is true for, say, 8–
12 year old children on the autism spectrum may not apply to
adults. This is a particular issue in ASD given that it is characterized
by what are sometimes called ‘‘asymmetric” development
patterns.4. Sensory symptoms in ASDs
Given that ASDs are deﬁned primarily in terms of social symp-
toms it may seem odd that sensory processing in these conditions
is of interest at all. However, there is a large body of literature
which attests to the prevalence of sensory symptoms within ASDs.
Sensory symptoms were featured in the original descriptions of
ASDs (Asperger, 1944; Kanner, 1943), and further explored by
Wing (1969) and Hermelin and O’Connor (1970). There are also
the eloquent accounts written by people on the autism spectrum
(e.g. Grandin, 1992, 2009; Grandin & Scariano, 1986; Jackson,
2002; Williams, 1998) or by their parents/caregivers (e.g. Jackson,
2003). Many of these accounts describe both hyper- and hypo-sen-
sitivity to sensory stimuli – often ﬂuctuating between the two ex-
tremes (Jones, Quigney, & Huws, 2003).
Despite the obvious value of their insight, there are problems
with the interpretation of ﬁrst-hand descriptions. Firstly, the re-
ports tend to come from high-functioning individuals with ASD,
so we do not know how well they apply to the autism spectrum
as a whole. Secondly, an account may have been written in con-
junction with someone who does not have ASD (e.g. Grandin &
Scariano, 1986), risking the intrusion of interpreter bias. Lastly,
O’Neill and Jones (1997) suggest that, for individuals with ASD,
there can be confusion over ‘real’ versus ‘echoed’ memories and a
lack of insight into typical perceptual experiences. A helpful sum-
mary of this literature is given by Bogdashina (2003).
A number of studies have collated this information by evaluat-
ing parent/caregiver questionnaires (Baker, Lane, Angley, & Young,
2008; Baranek, David, Poe, Stone, & Watson, 2006; Ben-Sasson
et al., 2007; Robertson & Simmons, 2008; Rogers, Hepburn, & Weh-
ner, 2003; Watling, Deitz, & White, 2001), sometimes combined
with information from the individuals themselves (Kern et al.,
2006, 2007; Leekam, Nieto, Libby, Wing, & Gould, 2007). These tell
the broadly similar story that (a) particular sensory symptoms ap-
pear to be more common in ASD than in other developmental dis-
orders; (b) these symptoms lessen with age; (c) these symptoms
are correlated with the severity of social symptoms of ASD, at least
in children (Kern et al., 2007).
There are a number of problems with caregiver/parent report
data. Methodological shortcomings (such as small sample sizes
and variability across groups) have affected the degree to which
these results can be generalized, reporters may attribute the child’s
reaction to the wrong sensory stimulus and are open to bias (e.g.
unwittingly over- or under-estimating the child’s sensory difﬁcul-
ties; see Nader, Oberlander, Chambers, & Craig, 2004). There are
also issues of recall bias, especially when recounting stressful
situations.
Although it has been suggested that the importance of sensory
symptoms from the report literature has not been conﬁrmed in
lab-based studies (O’Neill & Jones, 1997; Rogers & Ozonoff,
2005), we have recently found a strong correlation between sen-
sory symptoms reported by members of the general public and
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with third-party report (Robertson & Simmons, 2009).
5. Visual symptoms in ASD
A non-exhaustive list of visual sensory symptoms is given by
Bogdashina (2003):
Hyper:
(1) focusing on tiny pieces of dust/particles,
(2) dislike of the dark and bright lights,
(3) dislike of sharp ﬂashes of light,
(4) looking down most of the time,
(5) covering/closing eyes at bright lights.
Hypo:
(1) attracted to light,
(2) looking intensely at objects or people,
(3) moving ﬁngers or objects in front of the eyes,
(4) fascination with reﬂections and/or brightly coloured objects,
(5) running hands around the edges of objects.
Another list is given in Leekam et al. (2007) and corresponds to
questions asked in the DISCO diagnostic interview (Leekam et al.,
2002):
Quotes from individuals on the autism spectrum are also infor-
mative, e.g.:
‘‘my bed was surrounded and totally encased by tiny spots which I
called stars, like some kind of mystical glass cofﬁn. I have since
learned that they are actually air particles yet my vision was so
hypersensitive that they often became a hypnotic foreground with
the rest of ’the world’ fading away.”
-Donna Williams, p. 15, ‘‘Nobody Nowhere” (Williams, 1998).
There are also some commonly observed social symptoms
which may have a visual component such as unusual socially di-
rected pointing, difﬁculties with interpretation of gestures, unu-
sual eye contact, difﬁculty with the interpretation of facial
expressions, difﬁculty with following the gaze of others and difﬁ-
culties with joint attention, as well as non-social signs like repeti-
tive and stereotyped behaviours. Assessment of these symptoms is
included in the ADOS (Lord et al., 2000).6. Studies of visual processing in ASD
In this section of the review we shall deal with the full range of
possible visual differences between ASD and typical control
populations.
6.1. Optometric issues
Although many studies report screening the vision of their par-
ticipants, relatively few have focussed speciﬁcally on optometric
comparisons of ASD and typical populations. Scharre and Creedon
(1992) reviewed previous ﬁndings and also evaluated 34 children
(2–11 years) with autism for ocular alignment, refractive error, vi-
sual acuity, oculomotility skills and stereopsis. Scharre and Cree-
don (1992) noted a higher than average incidence of refractive
errors (consistent with results from other developmental disabili-
ties such as cerebral palsy), and also found that 21% of their chil-
dren had strabismus, comparing this with ﬁgures of 3.7% for
typical children, 69% in cerebral palsy and 21.4% in developmental
delay from other studies. They also reported that a ‘‘signiﬁcant
number” of the children had difﬁculty with voluntary pursuit eyemovements and had atypical OKN responses. They could not report
on the level of amblyopia in their sample because most of the chil-
dren resisted ocular occlusion, although only 3 of the 34 failed the
Lang stereotest. Given that Sharre and Creedon (1992) pre-dates
the publication of DSM-IV and ICD-10 diagnostic criteria it is pos-
sible that their data only apply to more severe cases of autism, as
DSM-III criteria were much more restrictive (Hincha-Ownby,
2008). A high prevalence of strabismus in ASD (50%) was also re-
ported by Kaplan, Rimland, and Edelson (1999) from a sample of
older children (7–19 years) along with a slightly lower prevalence
(20%) taken from a questionnaire survey of 7640 parents. Neither
of these studies is deﬁnitive in terms of establishing optometric
anomalies in ASD populations, since both relied on a previous clin-
ical diagnosis by unspeciﬁed techniques, the numbers of partici-
pants in the experimental studies were relatively small and there
were no control groups. The Kaplan et al. (1999) questionnaire
data also suffer from the known problems with parental reports.
Nevertheless, this ﬁnding would appear to be worthy of further
investigation. It does seem surprising that the large number of
researchers who have performed routine optometric screening of
their participants have not noticed the high prevalence of strabis-
mus in their ASD population (even if the conservative estimate of
20% applies). Kaplan (2006) has recently embedded these optomet-
ric data into his theory of visual dysfunction in autism.
6.2. Spatial vision
6.2.1. Visual acuity
The visual acuity of children and adults with ASD has been
routinely measured as part of the screening procedure in a num-
ber of studies with nothing untoward being reported, but one
very recent study focused exclusively on visual acuity (Ashwin,
Ashwin, Rhydderch, Howells, & Baron-Cohen, 2009). They mea-
sured visual acuity in 15 individuals with ASD and 15 controls
using the Freiburg Visual Acuity and Contrast Test (Bach, 1996)
and reported a very high mean level of visual acuity in their
ASD sample (20/7) compared to the 20/13 of the typical control
group. Unfortunately it appears that the spatial resolution of
the display screen was not high enough to support acuity mea-
surement at the viewing distance used, and some of the settings
on the computerized test were inappropriate (Bach & Dakin, in
press). Consequently this apparently exciting result must be re-
garded as unsound.
6.2.2. Static contrast sensitivity
de Jonge, Kemner, de Haan, Coppens, and van den Berg (2007)
used the Vistech contrast sensitivity charts to compare perfor-
mance at a range of spatial frequencies (1.5–18 c/deg) between a
group of 29 people with ASD and age-matched controls. The clini-
cal sample (7–33 years) was carefully diagnosed using multiple
instruments including the ADI-R and ADOS. De Jonge et al.
(2007) found no signiﬁcant differences between the two groups.
Obviously the clinical sample was relatively small, and the test
was not as sensitive to subtle differences as a computer-based test
would be, but it does suggest that there are no large differences in
static contrast sensitivity between individuals with HFA and
matched controls. Behrmann et al. (2006a) and Milne, Scope, Pas-
calis, Buckley, and Makeig (2009) have also reported no differences
in static contrast sensitivity for gratings of different spatial fre-
quencies between ASD and matched control populations.
Bertone, Mottron, Jelenic, and Faubert (2005) compared con-
trast thresholds for orientation identiﬁcation between a group of
13 HFA participants (11–31 years) and matched typical controls.
Diagnosis was using ADI and ADOS. The stimuli were either
luminance- (i.e. ﬁrst-order) or contrast-modulated (i.e. second-
order) grayscale noise. The sinusoidal modulations had a spatial
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750 ms. The ASD participants were carefully guided through the
task, with the experimenter remaining in the room, reminding
the participants to ﬁxate and initiating successive trials. This care
will have served to reduce any noise in the data due to attentional
lapses. The result found was surprising in that the HFA group ob-
tained signiﬁcantly lower thresholds with the ﬁrst-order stimuli
than the matched controls, but signiﬁcantly higher thresholds with
the second-order stimuli (see Fig. 1).
Sanchez-Marin and Padilla-Medina (2008) measured the
detectability of a static bright bar embedded in Gaussian noise in
six participants with autism (7–17 years) and six controls. The chil-
dren with autism were characterized using the Childhood Autism
Rating Scale (CARS; Schopler, Reichler, DeVellis, & Daly, 1980),
although there was no attempt to match IQ with controls, which
is unfortunate as the children with autism had relatively severe
symptoms. Sanchez-Marin and Padilla-Medina (2008) found that
children with autism performed signiﬁcantly worse than controls
at a range of signal/noise ratios. They argued that these data could
reﬂect the inﬂuence of increased levels of internal noise in visual
processing pathways in autism. Whilst this conclusion is very
interesting (see Section 13 below), the experiment should have
used a more carefully controlled group of participants.6.2.3. Dynamic contrast sensitivity
Bertone et al. (2005) also measured contrast thresholds for a
ﬂickering grating stimulus using a temporal 2AFC paradigm. They
used a conventional 0.5 c/deg grating counterphasing at 6 Hz
(ostensibly to stimulate magnocellular pathways) and a 6 c/deg
grating counterphasing at 1 Hz (ditto for parvocellular pathways).
There were no signiﬁcant differences in contrast sensitivity for
either of these stimuli between the HFA group and controls. A sim-
ilar result was found by Pellicano, Gibson, Maybery, Durkin, and
Badcock (2005) using similar procedures and carefully diagnosedFig. 1. Figure from Bertone et al. (2005) showing contrast thresholds for orientation
identiﬁcation (horizontal/vertical) in noise for ﬁrst-order and second-order grating
stimuli collected from children with high functioning autism (HFA) and typically
developing controls (TD). The stimuli used are shown beneath the graph. Note that
the units on the y-axis are contrast, not orientation. Reproduced with the
permission of Oxford University Press.and matched participants, except that the stimulus was a Gaussian
blob (3.15 deg sigma) ﬂickering sinusoidally at 10 Hz.
Bertone, Mottron, Jelenic, and Faubert (2003) reported contrast
sensitivities for drifting grating stimuli deﬁned by either lumi-
nance- (i.e. ﬁrst-order) or contrast- (i.e. second-order) modulated
grayscale noise. The gratings were either conventional vertical
sinusoids, radially symmetric sinusoids or angled sinusoids in or-
der to test translational, radial and rotational motion, respectively.
For the translating and radial patterns the spatial frequency was
1 c/deg with a temporal frequency of 2 Hz, giving a drift rate of
2 deg/s. For the rotating grating the angular velocity was p/2 rad/
s. The participants were a well diagnosed HFA sample (mean age
13 years) and a typical control group (mean age 12 years). Bertone
et al. (2003) found no difference between contrast thresholds for
ﬁrst-order motion detection with these two groups, but did ﬁnd
signiﬁcantly higher thresholds for second-order motion detection
with the ASD group. There was no effect of motion type (see
Fig. 2). Whilst this result has yet to be replicated, an interesting re-
cent study by McCleery, Allman, Carver, and Dobkins (2007) does
lend qualiﬁed support. They measured contrast thresholds for the
detection of 0.27 c/deg gratings drifting upwards or downwards
at 15.6 deg/s. Their sample was 13 6-month-old infants who each
had older siblings that had been diagnosed with ASD. The chance
of being diagnosed with ASD is 10–20 times more likely in this
‘‘high-risk” group than in the general population (Dawson et al.,
2002b; Plomin & McGufﬁn, 2003) and the study was aimed at
deﬁning the characteristics of this population before ASD diagnosis
was possible. Being infants, a preferential-looking technique was
used to gather detection data. Curiously, they found that the con-
trast thresholds of this ‘‘high-risk” group for the drifting gratings
were signiﬁcantly lower than those of the control population. This
was true even when those infants who were subsequently diag-
nosed with ASD (two) were removed from the analysis. McCleery
et al. (2007) found no performance difference with similarly drift-
ing isoluminant chromatic red-green gratings and interpreted their
results in terms of differential sensitivities of M and P pathways in
the high-risk and control groups.
Sanchez-Marin and Padilla-Medina (2008) also measured
thresholds for detection of their bright bar stimulus when it was
moving across the display. As with the static version of their task,
they found that the children with autism were signiﬁcantly worse
at detecting the stimulus at a range of signal-to-noise ratios. How-
ever, the reservations about the methodology of this study pre-
sented above apply here too.
6.2.4. Contrast sensitivity summary
To summarise, no study with well-matched controls has dem-
onstrated poorer contrast sensitivity in an ASD group where the
stimuli are deﬁned by luminance contrast. One study (Bertone
et al., 2005) has demonstrated signiﬁcantly lower thresholds in
an ASD group for a static contrast sensitivity task, and this was also
true for a so-called ‘‘high-risk” infant population when the stimu-
lus was dynamic (McCleery et al., 2007). In both studies where the
stimulus was ‘‘second-order” (i.e. deﬁned by contrast modula-
tions), the modulation thresholds of the ASD group were signiﬁ-
cantly higher than those of controls (Bertone et al., 2003, 2005).
6.2.5. Spatial grouping/contour integration
Several studies have compared performance of ASD and typical
populations in contour integration tasks similar to those ﬁrst em-
ployed by Field, Hayes, and Hess (1993). These have been targeted
at evaluating the ‘‘weak central coherence” (WCC) theory, ﬁrst put
forward by Frith (1989) and most recently elaborated by Happé
and Frith (2006). WCC theory suggests that individuals with ASD
have difﬁculty integrating information, including visual informa-
tion, from different spatial and or temporal sources. However,
Fig. 3. The Glass pattern stimulus used by Spencer and O’Brien (2006) in their study
of motion and form coherence in autism. Reproduced with the permission of Pion
Limited, London.
Fig. 2. Stimuli and data from Bertone et al. (2003). Reproduced with permission of MIT Press.
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gration studies for using oriented line elements, arguing that the
target contour would be detectable simply by low-pass ﬁltering
the stimulus, and therefore that they were not true tests of contour
integration, but merely contrast detection. This criticism applies to
the studies by Spencer et al. (2000), Blake, Turner, Smoski, Pozdol,
and Stone (2003) and Milne et al. (2006) (none of which demon-
strated a signiﬁcant difference between ASD and control groups).
More recently, however, two studies using Gabor elements – which
are not prone to the same criticism – have both shown no signiﬁ-
cant differences between ASD and control populations in this task
(Del Viva, Igliozzi, Tancredi, & Brizzolara, 2006; Kemner, Lamme,
Kovacs, & van Engelund, 2007). Thus there is no evidence for a per-
formance deﬁcit in contour integration tasks amongst ASD popula-
tions. Two caveats should be added, though. The ﬁrst is that only
high-functioning ASD populations and controls have been com-
pared and the second is that all of these studies used closed, rather
than open contours.
Two recent related studies have reported a deﬁcit in visual form
processing in ASD. Spencer and O’Brien (2006) used oriented
‘‘Glass” patterns composed of correlated dot triplets. Structured
elements were intermixed with randomly oriented elements (see
Fig. 3) to obtain a threshold coherence measure for locating the cir-
cular patch either side of the display centre. The display was de-
signed to match as closely as possible a similarly constructed
motion coherence display (see below). Unusually there were three
participant groups: an autism group of 15 (mean age 13.5 years),
an Asperger group of 10 (mean age 12 years) and a typical group
of 15 (mean age 12 years). The groups were matched for CA and
VMA using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn,
Dunn, & Whetton, 1982). Note that both autism and Asperger
groups had IQ greater than or equal to 70 and therefore were both
‘‘high-functioning”. Spencer and O’Brien (2006) reported a signiﬁ-
cant threshold difference between their autism group and both
the typical controls (35.5% higher) and the Asperger group (26%
higher) in the form coherence task. This result is surprising, given
negative results in this sort of task from other groups and that it
differentiates performance between AS and HFA. If replicable, it
is important in suggesting that task performance might depend
on position on the autism spectrum (assuming, of course, that
HFA and AS correspond to differing severities of ASD). However,there are some problems with this study. First, the method of diag-
nosis: it is simply stated that they ‘‘met the relevant diagnostic cri-
teria in DSM-IV”. If task performance were related to ASD severity
a quantitative assessment of this would have been desirable (see,
e.g., Blake et al., 2003). A second concern is about the stimuli.
Although these were Glass patterns rather than line elements,
the same problems of low spatial-frequency luminance artifacts
raised by Dakin and Frith (2005) apply. However, this would not
explain the pattern of the results unless somehow the HFA group
was insensitive to these luminance cues for some reason, but the
AS and control group were. Finally, the presentation time was
exceptionally brief for experiments of this kind (250 ms), and too
brief for participants to make stimulus-elicited eye movements.
It is plausible that the deﬁcit in the HFA group was not one of form
coherence per se, but the problem of dividing attention between
two halves of a stimulus display, the centres of which were sepa-
rated by 15.4 deg of visual angle (cf. Plaisted, Swettenham, & Rees,
1999, but also Rutherford, Richards, Moldes, & Sekuler, 2007b).
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was found in the matched motion coherence task (see below).
Tsermentseli, O’Brien, and Spencer (2008) replicated the pattern
of Spencer and O’Brien’s (2006) data in a sample of adults, lending
force to the argument for a form processing deﬁcit speciﬁc to aut-
ism diagnoses, but not Asperger Syndrome. Some of the same crit-
icisms apply to this study. Tsermentseli et al. (2008) suggest that
the presence of superior language skills in the Asperger group
might be related to the differential performance which, as with
Spencer and O’Brien (2006), seems to carry over to the motion
coherence task as well.
Further support for the view put forward by Spencer and
O’Brien (2006) and Tsermentseli et al. (2008) is provided by Bros-
nan, Scott, Fox, and Pye (2004). They looked at a variety of tasks
in a group of 25 children with autism and 25 age- and VMA-
matched controls. The mean CAs were about 10 years and the
mean VMAs about 5 years, meaning that the control group had
moderate learning difﬁculties. The tasks utilized the gestalt
grouping rules of proximity, similarity and closure in simple line
and dot ﬁgures. Brosnan et al. (2004) found that their autism
group were effectively at chance in these tasks, unlike the con-
trols, and also impaired on identifying impossible ﬁgures,
although this deﬁcit was not so pronounced on having to draw
reproductions of them (cf. Mottron & Belleville, 1993; Mottron,
Belleville, & Menard, 1999a). A similar result has been found by
Bölte, Holtmann, Poustka, Scheurich, and Schmidt (2007) in a
group of adults with HFA.6.2.6. Static shape perception
De Jonge et al. (2007) found normal shape discrimination in
their ASD population (squares vs. rectangles matched in area).
However, Ropar and Mitchell (2002) found a curious failure of
shape constancy in their group of children with autism. The task
involved setting the shape of an ellipse on a computer screen to
match the shape of a circle viewed in a special chamber, but tilted
away from the viewer. Control participants typically set the ellipse
to be more circular than it looks due to the knowledge that it is
really a circle, and this effect is strongest when the circle is pre-
sented by itself and without any perspective cues. However, the
autism group did not show this effect and set the shape of the el-
lipse more accurately, suggesting that they were not so inﬂuenced
by the knowledge that the shape was a circle. Ropar and Mitchell
(2002) suggested that this result shows that individuals with aut-
ism are less inﬂuenced by prior knowledge in visual judgements
and consequently visual processing may be less ‘top-down’ domi-
nated in autism.6.2.7. Susceptibility to visual illusions
Happé (1996) was the ﬁrst to suggest that ASD populations
were less susceptible to these illusions (speciﬁcally the Ponzo, Pog-
gendorff, Ebbinghaus/Titchener, Hering and Kanisza triangle, but
not the Müller-Lyer). These claims have been supported by Bölte
et al. (2007). Happé’s (2006) original ﬁndings were, however, dis-
puted by Ropar and Mitchell (1999, 2001). Commentators (e.g. Da-
kin & Frith, 2005; Happé & Frith, 2006) have suggested that this
apparent discrepancy could be due to ‘‘methodological differences”
between the studies. In particular, in Happé (1996) participants
were asked to judge whether the elements in an illusion display
(normally perceived as different in size) were ‘‘the same” or ‘‘dif-
ferent”. Many of the ASD participants reported ‘‘the same”, sug-
gesting that they were not susceptible to the illusion. Ropar and
Mitchell (1999, 2001) used a computer-based method for adjusting
the relative sizes of the illusory-sized elements and found no sig-
niﬁcant differences between their ASD population and controls.
No signiﬁcant difference between ASD and control groups in illu-sion susceptibility has also been reported by Hoy, Hatton, and Hare
(2004) and Milne and Scope (2008).
An interesting recent study byWalter, Dassonville, and Bochsler
(2009) may have clariﬁed this discrepancy. Walter et al. (2009)
used a large sample of 146 undergraduate students who performed
a battery of tasks including psychophysical tests of a number of
standard illusions and the Autism Spectrum, Empathising and
Systemising Quotient questionnaires (AQ: Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001b; EQ: Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; SQ: Baron-Cohen,
Richler, Bisarya, Gurunuthan, & Wheelwright, 2003, respectively),
which measure traits associated with autism in the general popu-
lation. Walter et al.’s (2009) key result was that susceptibility to
the Zöllner, Rod-and-frame, Roelofs, Ponzo and Poggendorff illu-
sions related to score on the SQ, such that immunity to these illu-
sions was associated with a high Systemizing Quotient. This
suggests that previous results with populations on the autism
spectrum (only one of the students scored high enough on the
AQ to be considered a possible candidate for diagnosis) may have
been affected by this trait, which is associated with ASD, rather
than the diagnostic category in itself. Walter et al. (2009) also
make a number of pertinent criticisms about methodology in pre-
vious studies of illusory susceptibility.
Brown, Gruber, Boucher, Rippon, and Brock (2004) looked at a
different illusion: the Kanisza triangle. They found no difference
in behavioural performance between their six adolescents with
autism and matched learning-disabled controls but there were
anomalies in the simultaneously recorded EEG responses. In partic-
ular the induced activity in the gamma band (25–70 Hz) over pari-
etal regions was different from that of the control group. A recent
technical paper has cast doubt on the integrity of some induced
gamma band activity recorded with EEG, suggesting that if it has
the proﬁle illustrated by Brown et al. (2004) it is most likely an
artifact due to small-amplitude saccadic eye movements (Yuval-
Greenberg, Tomer, Keren, Nelken, & Deouell, 2008). Any study
which does not control for these eye movements can no longer
claim to demonstrate neural gamma oscillations when measured
in this way, so Brown et al.’s (2004) results may well be reﬂecting
differential ﬁxational eye movement activity between the diagnos-
tic groups, rather than anything signiﬁcant about neural responses.
Some ideas about how to control and interpret these artifacts have
recently been suggested by Melloni, Schwiedrzik, Rodriguez, and
Singer (2009).
6.2.8. Visual completion
A different approach to exploring context sensitivity effects
within ASD was taken by De Wit, Schlooz, Hulstijn, and van Lier
(2007), who used a shape completion task. In shape completion
tasks a shape (e.g. a circle) is initially presented partially occluded
behind another shape (e.g. a rectangle). After a short break the par-
ticipant is then presented with two alternative shapes and has to
choose which one they think they saw (Sekuler & Palmer, 1992).
De Wit et al.’s (2007) variation involved using a shape completion
priming task. The occluded shape was presented as a prime. Partic-
ipants were then presented with two different (or identical) alter-
native shapes and asked to speedily report whether they were the
same or different. Depending on the type of prime stimulus this
judgement was performed either as fast or more quickly when
the prime was in place than when it was not. The argument is that
priming effects show evidence of different types of shape sensitiv-
ity. De Wit et al.’s (2007) clinical sample was slightly unusual in
that they chose to focus on PDD-NOS, deﬁned by the presence of
only a subset of the usual symptoms of autism. In total there were
19 participants in their clinical group (mean age 12 years): 16
PDD-NOS and 3 AS. The control group was matched for CA and
IQ. Their pattern of results was quite complicated. The clinical
group had largely similar reaction times to controls, but differed
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(2007) argued that their results demonstrate that their PDD group
was able to integrate context so as to complete partially occluded
stimuli effectively, but they had somewhat more difﬁculty with
unusual/unfamiliar or complex shapes. This may indicate a greater
difﬁculty in learning novel shapes (or a greater sensitivity to differ-
ences between them).
6.2.9. Reading
The published data on reading ability in ASD show a large
amount of variability (Whitehouse & Harris, 1984). Recent studies
have suggested that the problems that people with ASD have with
reading are dissociable from their symptoms (Ludlow, Wilkins, &
Heaton, 2006; White et al., 2006).
6.3. Colour vision
There are a large number of anecdotal reports of unusual re-
sponses to colour among people on the autism spectrum (e.g.
Williams, 1999; see also Franklin, Sowden, Burley, Notman, &
Alder, 2008; Ludlow et al., 2006). Individuals on the autism spec-
trum can display strong afﬁnities to, or aversions from, objects of
particular colours (Ludlow & Wilkins, 2009; Moore, 2004). A few
studies have reported incidental effects of colour: Brian, Tipper,
Weaver, and Bryson (2003) found an unexpected facilitation effect
of colour in their study of inhibitory mechanisms in ASD and
Greenaway and Plaisted (2005) found a similar effect in a cueing
task, where invalid colour cues resulted in greater costs for individ-
uals with ASD than for controls.
The ﬁrst dedicated study of colour vision in ASD was Ludlow
et al. (2006), who tested the efﬁcacy of coloured overlays on the
reading performance of a group of children on the autism spectrum
and a gender-, age- and VIQ-matched control group. The ASD group
showed a modest but signiﬁcant average improvement in reading
speed of 13% with the overlays in place. Note that part of Ludlow
et al’s (2006) screening process used the City and Ishihara colour
vision tests, and nothing unusual was found, but this was too small
a sample to assert that colour vision is clinically normal in ASD.
Ludlow et al. (2006) couch their explanation of the reading
improvements observed in the ASD group in terms of Wilkins’
(2003) theory that appropriately chosen coloured ﬁlters can limit
the spread of activation in hyper-excitable areas of visual cortex
(see also Ludlow & Wilkins, 2009).
Three very recent studies deal directlywith the visual processing
of chromatic information inASD:Heaton, Ludlow,&Roberson, 2008;
Franklin et al., 2008, in press. Heaton et al. (2008) used three groups
of 13 childrenandadolescents (meanage11 years). Onegroupwas
from a school specializing in autism and thus was assumed to meet
appropriate diagnostic criteria, one from a school for children with
moderate learning difﬁculties (MLD) and one group of typically
developing (TD) children. Groups were all individually matched for
chronological age and the MLD and autism groups were matched
for non-verbal MA (assessed using Raven’s matrices). However,
VMA (measuredusing the BPVS)was signiﬁcantly different between
all three groups, with the autism group having the lowest (mean
5.5 years). After checking that all groups could name and distin-
guish the11basic colours correctly, theyperformedadiscrimination
task: three coloured patches, two the same and one differing by a
small step in Munsell hue space were presented on a computer
screen and participants chose the odd one out. Both autism and
MLD groups were impaired on this task relative to the TD controls,
although not with respect to each other. Performance in this task
correlatedwithVMA. The secondexperiment tested colourmemory.
The same children were taught to associate pictures of familiar ani-
mals with ‘‘focal” colours (i.e. red, green, blue and yellow) then sub-
sequently tested by presenting the animal together with the fourcolours,with the children being asked to choosewhich onematched
the animal. In this phase of the experiment the autism and MLD
groups were just above chance, but the TD group performed quite
well. In the second phase of the experiment, after amemory refresh-
ment, theparticipantswerepresentedwith threealternative colours
for each animal picture, but this time each colour was drawn from
the same colour category (e.g. three shades of red). In this phase of
the task only the autism group scored above chance. In fact, when
calculated as a z-score, the performance of the autism group was
about the same in both phases of the task. Subsequent analysis
showed that phase 1 performance correlated signiﬁcantlywith both
VMAanddiscrimination performance from the ﬁrst experiment, but
in phase 2 there was a signiﬁcant negative correlation with VMA,
suggesting that the children with lowest VMA performed best in
the task.Heatonet al. (2008) suggest that there is a profound linkbe-
tween verbal ability and perceptual discrimination and that typi-
cally developing children apply verbal labels to the colours, and
therefore are confused in thememory taskwhenpresentedwith col-
ourswhich have the same verbal label. Childrenwith language difﬁ-
culties, on the other hand, are forced to remember the colour
perceptually, and thus are less confused so long as the colours are
discriminably different. This differential performance is reminiscent
of theperformance of ASDgroups in the EmbeddedFigures Task (Jol-
liffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Shah & Frith, 1983) where a learned
grouping of information disrupts performance in a TD group, but
not in a group with ASD.
Franklin et al. (2008) worked with 19 children with HFA
(7–13 years) attending specialist schools and 14 CA- and NVIQ-
(Raven’s Matrices) matched controls. Importantly, none of the
children were diagnosed with ADHD, as it has been shown that
these children tend to have blue-yellow colour deﬁciencies (Banas-
chewski et al., 2006). Franklin et al. (2008) speciﬁed their stimuli in
CIELAB colour space which were either coloured patches or ab-
stract form stimuli, constructed from a standard set (Pick, 1965).
The ﬁrst experiment consisted of a visual search task and a visual
memory task. In the search task, participants were asked to spot
the odd coloured patch or the odd form in an array of distracters.
The memory task was a delayed match-to-sample, with two
choices, one the same as the target and one foil, differing slightly
in colour or in form (curvature). Having checked that there was
no interaction, data from the two tasks were combined, and it
was found that the ASD group was impaired on the colour task,
but not the form task. The second experiment was performed with
two groups of 14 slightly older children (11–13 years). The exper-
iment tested categorical perception of colour across the blue–green
boundary (Franklin, Pilling, & Davies, 2005). The 2AFC task was to
locate the presence (i.e. left or right of centre) of a coloured target
on a coloured background. The target was either drawn from the
same or different colour categories. Accuracy on the task did not
differ between within- and between-category judgements, but
the ASD group performed signiﬁcantly worse than the controls.
Reaction times (RTs) showed a category boundary effect, with
the task being performed more quickly by both groups when the
colours were sampled from different categories. However, there
were no signiﬁcant differences in RT between the groups.
Franklin et al. (in press) tested similarly characterized groups
on the Farnsworth–Munsell 100-hue test (Farnsworth, 1943), and
a conventional chromatic discrimination task which involved
detecting the orientation of the boundary between two isolumi-
nant colours. In both experiments there were control tasks which
used stimuli differing only in luminance. As with Franklin et al.
(2008) the ASD group performed signiﬁcantly worse on the colour
experiments with higher error scores on the FM-100 hue test and
higher thresholds on the chromatic discrimination task. However,
no signiﬁcant differences were found in the luminance tasks. Note
that the chromatic discrimination difﬁculties of the ASD group
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red–green or blue–yellow opponent axes.
The conclusion from this series of studies is that children with
ASD are challenged in a range of chromatic discrimination tasks
compared to typical controls matched on non-verbal intelligence
and these difﬁculties do not transfer to similar luminance discrim-
ination tasks. Franklin et al. (in press) estimate that performance of
the ASD group in the FM-100 task is comparable to that of children
3 years younger. It is unfortunate, however, that Franklin et al.
(2008, in press) did not report VMA in their studies, given the po-
tential importance of this factor (Heaton et al., 2008). Verbal ability
is known to be closely linked to colour naming performance in
young children (Pitchford & Mullen, 2002) and a very recent ERP
study in mono- and bi-lingual adults has suggested that colour lan-
guage can affect the very earliest stages of perception (Thierry,
Athanasopoulos, Wiggett, Dering, & Kuipers, 2009). Also, all three
studies (Franklin et al., 2008, in press; Heaton et al., 2008) failed
to characterize fully the diagnostic status of their participants.
Nevertheless, these results are exciting and, if they are found to
be speciﬁc to ASD, have profound implications for our understand-
ing of early visual processing in this condition.
6.4. Depth perception and stereopsis
There are three lines of evidence which suggest that the percep-
tion of depth in ASD merits further attention. First, there is a range
of clinical and anecdotal reports about depth perception being
unusual in ASD. Kaplan (2006), for example, notes his observations
that people with ASD often mis-judge inter-personal distance dur-
ing social interaction and have difﬁculties with tasks such as ball-
catching. Second, there is evidence for a higher incidence of stra-
bismus in ASD populations (Kaplan et al., 1999; Scharre & Creedon,
1992), which would suggest that binocular vision and stereopsis
might also be affected. Third, because stereopsis requires a precise
developmental registration of information from each eye, it is
developmentally fragile (Atkinson, 2000). Depth perception and
stereopsis in ASD would seem to be an area where at the very least
a screening study is warranted.
6.5. Motion perception
Motion perception is one of the most-studied and most contro-
versial areas in the ﬁeld of vision in ASD. Reviews by Dakin and
Frith (2005) and Milne, Swettenham, and Campbell (2005; plus
associated peer commentaries) cover the literature up to 2005 in
considerable detail, so we will concentrate on more recent studies.
6.5.1. Local motion
Surprisingly, only one published study has examined low-level
local motion processing in an ASD population: the Bertone et al.
(2003) study described in detail above (see Fig. 2). Bertone et al.
(2003) found no signiﬁcant difference in contrast thresholds for
ﬁrst-order motion direction identiﬁcation between their ASD and
control groups, but there was a relative deﬁcit in second-order mo-
tion processing, with the ASD group exhibiting signiﬁcantly higher
modulation thresholds for the direction identiﬁcation task. Pub-
lished criticisms of Bertone et al. (2003) have tended to focus on
the explanation of the result in terms of the ‘‘complexity” of mo-
tion processing, rather than questioning the result itself (see Dakin
& Frith, 2005; Jarrold & Scott-Samuel, 2005; Mitchell, Ledgeway, &
Landry, 2005). Interestingly, Kogan et al. (2004) measured local
motion processing in Fragile-X Syndrome (FXS) – a genetic disor-
der which shares some of its symptomatology with ASD – using
similar techniques and stimuli to Bertone et al. (2003). Kogan
et al. (2004) found that modulation thresholds for local motion
direction identiﬁcation were impaired for both ﬁrst- and second-order stimuli in this population, suggesting that the pattern of re-
sults found by Bertone et al. (2003) is particularly speciﬁc to ASD
(see also Bertone & Faubert, 2006).
Vandenbroucke, Scholte, van Engelund, Lamme, and Kemner
(2008) recently examined two-grating plaid motion processing in
a group of adults with HFA and typical controls, matched for CA
and IQ. They found no signiﬁcant differences between the partici-
pant groups in the relative amount of time that the plaid was seen
moving as a coherent whole, rather than as two transparent com-
ponents. There were also no signiﬁcant differences between groups
in the rivalry rate. They concluded that there was no evidence for a
difﬁculty with combining motion information in their ASD popula-
tion, invoking an explanation in terms of the spatial frequency con-
tent of their displays, which was predominantly low. They argued
that individuals with ASD may have less difﬁculty processing mo-
tion of low than high spatial frequency gratings, comparing their
data with that of Bertone et al. (2003) and the motion coherence
studies considered below. Given this explanation it is unfortunate
that Vandenbroucke et al. (2008) did not use sinusoidal gratings as
their plaid components, as this would simplify the interpretation of
their results, but they certainly suggest that the perception of high-
contrast two-component motion is unaffected in adults with HFA.
A further useful piece of information, given the results of Spencer
and O’Brien (2006) and Tsermentseli et al. (2008) discussed below,
would be how many of their HFA group could be characterized as
having Asperger Syndrome.
6.5.2. Motion coherence
A typical motion coherence stimulus consists of a large number
of randomly moving dots of which a small proportion move coher-
ently in a given direction and give a ﬂeeting perception of motion
(Newsome & Paré, 1988). Threshold for the task is deﬁned as the
percentage of dots required to be moving coherently before the ob-
server can reliably report their direction of motion. Usually this is
run as a 2AFC task, with the motions being up vs. down or left vs.
right. Newsome and Paré (1988) originally used this stimulus as a
probe for investigating the efﬁcacy of microscopic lesions in Area
V5/MT of macaque monkeys on the monkeys’ motion discrimina-
tion abilities.
Wattam-Bell (1994) developed a slightly different version of
this stimulus for use in preferential looking tasks with infants,
which Atkinson and Braddick (2005) describe as a ‘‘road in the
snowstorm” stimulus. In this stimulus the signal dots oscillate
backwards and forwards in a horizontal direction and the noise
dots appear transiently for the same duration (120 ms) in random
locations. In one half of the display the signal dots all move in the
same direction. In the other half of the display a central strip con-
tains dots moving in the exact opposite direction. This results in a
segmented percept rather like looking at a road in a snowstorm.
This was precisely the class of stimulus used by Spencer et al.
(2000) to look at motion coherence thresholds in an ASD popula-
tion. Their sample of 23 children with ‘‘autistic disorder” (diagnos-
tic technique not speciﬁed) had signiﬁcantly higher motion
coherence thresholds than the CA-matched controls (see Table 1).
There was a smaller and non-signiﬁcant difference between ASD
and control performance in a similar form coherence task. Interest-
ingly, motion coherence thresholds in the ASD group did decrease
with age (7–11 years), as did those of the controls, although the ra-
tio of ASD/control performance remained about the same in all age
groups. Also, whereas control performance reached adult levels by
the age of 11, this was not true of the ASD group, although there
were no data on teenagers with ASD to test whether motion coher-
ence thresholds were consistently higher through to adulthood or
just developmentally delayed.
Milne et al. (2002) criticized Spencer et al. (2000) for not match-
ing their control population for IQ. Milne et al.’s (2002) sample
Table 1
Stimulus parameters from studies on motion coherence. Note that  denotes a signiﬁcant difference and  a marginal difference between coherence thresholds.
Dot diameter
(deg)
Coherent motion speed
(deg/s)
Total dots per
frame
Dot density
(dots/deg2)
Display duration
(ms)
Dot lifetime
(ms)
Results (%) A = ASD
C = CONTROL
Spencer et al. (2000) ?? 5.8 2000 4 330a 17 A: 25.5**
C: 17.5
Milne et al. (2002) 1 pixel 8.8 150 0.3 1010 224 A: 25.0**
(=0.1?) C: 15.3
Pellicano et al. (2005) 0.1 6.3 100 0.4 600 30 A: 22.4**
C: 11.1
Milne et al. (2006) 0.1 7 300 2.1 85b 85 A: 17.2*
C: 10.3
Spencer and O’Brien (2006) ?? 5.8 5655 4 166 50 Aut: 46.2**
Asp: 28.7
C: 24.6
Del Viva et al. (2006) 0.4 10 100c 0.4 160 66 A: 4.9
Cl: 6.9
C2: 5.5
a Before direction reversal. The total duration was self-limited.
b Also before direction reversal. Total duration 2300 ms.
c 50% black; 50% white.
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controls matched for CA and NVIQ (which was in the normal range
for both groups). The diagnostic method was ‘‘according to DSM-IV
criteria”. The children were also all attending specialist schools.
Milne et al.’s (2002) stimulus was closer to the Newsome and
Paré (1988) style with a single display region and the task being
to identify the direction of coherent motion. The display dynamics
were also slightly different. A central ﬁxation cross was present
throughout stimulus presentation which the children were in-
structed to ﬁxate. Mean thresholds for the ASD and control groups
gave a similar performance ratio to that of Spencer et al. (2000). As
with Spencer et al. (2000), the range of performance was greater in
the ASD group (6–64% rather than 6–29%), but the inter-group dif-
ference was still signiﬁcant when two of the ASD group with very
high thresholds were removed from the calculations.
The studies of Spencer et al. (2000) and Milne et al. (2002)
seemed to provide a coherent story: motion coherence thresholds
were signiﬁcantly higher in juvenile ASD populations, consistent
with either Magnocellular pathway or ‘‘Dorsal stream vulnerabil-
ity” arguments about the neural symptoms of ASD (Braddick,
Atkinson, & Wattam-Bell, 2003; Milne et al., 2005). However,
results from more recent studies have complicated this
interpretation.
The most extreme position is occupied by Del Viva et al. (2006).
In their version of the paradigm a display of 100 black and white
dots was used on a gray background. Their ASD population was
carefully diagnosed using ADI-R and ADOS-G and they excluded
participants with genetic syndromes. They also used two control
groups: one matched on CA and the other matched on VMA. Their
motion stimuli were based on optic ﬂow stimuli previously used
by Morrone, Burr, and Vaina (1995) including rotational, transla-
tional and radial motion. They found no overall difference in coher-
ence thresholds between their ASD group and either of the control
populations.
The other extreme amongst recent papers is represented by Pel-
licano et al. (2005). They found a highly signiﬁcant difference be-
tween global dot motion thresholds of their ASD and control
groups, without any overlap in the 95% conﬁdence intervals based
on the data although, as usual, the variance on the ASD popula-
tion’s thresholds was considerably larger than that of the control
group. The other recent studies which have looked at motion
coherence obtained results between these two extremes. Spencer
and O’Brien (2006) divided their participants into those with HFA
and those with AS and found that motion coherence thresholds dif-fered signiﬁcantly from controls for the HFA group, but not the AS
group. This pattern of results was conﬁrmed in an adult population
by Tsermentseli et al. (2008). Milne et al. (2006) also found that
only a sub-group of their ASD population (about 20%) had motion
coherence thresholds outside the typical range.
Recent data using the motion coherence paradigm to compare
performance of children with and without ASD thus gives com-
pletely conﬂicting results ranging from no difference, to partial dif-
ference to complete difference, making it very difﬁcult to draw
ﬁrm conclusions on what the data mean. Clearly there are method-
ological differences between the studies that may explain the con-
ﬂicting data. As this is such a well-studied and important area of
vision in ASD it is worth considering these in some detail.
Both Del Viva et al. (2006) and Pellicano et al. (2005) took con-
siderable care in the diagnosis of their ASD populations. As men-
tioned above Del Viva et al. (2006) used both ADI and ADOS and
excluded genetic syndromes from their population. Pellicano
et al. (2005) did not use the ADOS, but they did conﬁrm diagnoses
using ADI. They also screened their control population using the
Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter, Bailey, & Lord,
2003). Del Viva et al. (2006) used two control populations, one
matched for CA and the other matched for VMA, but they found
no difference between them. Pellicano et al. (2005) had twice the
number of ASD participants (20 vs. 10) and matched on NVIQ, as
measured by Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices. Pellicano
et al. (2005) point out that the VIQ of their comparison populations
was different (means of 119 and 137, respectively, for ASD and
controls) but that the receptive language of the ASD group was
adequate for understanding task instructions. Here we have the
ﬁrst potential difference between the two studies, although Del
Viva et al.’s (2006) second control group (C2), matched on CA,
would probably have been the most similar to the controls of Pel-
licano et al. (2005).
The stimuli used by these two studies were, however, substan-
tially different. Detailed parameters are presented in Table 1. Key
differences are that although both studies used the same number
of dots in their displays, those of Del Viva et al. (2006) were black
and white on a gray background, were four times larger in diame-
ter, and moving about 1.6 times faster than those of Pellicano et al.
(2005). The display dynamics were also different. In Del Viva et al.
(2006), total duration was brief, at 160 ms, with an individual dot
lifetime of 66 ms, corresponding to four frame refreshes of the dis-
play. In Pellicano et al. (2005) the overall stimulus duration was
much longer (600 ms) although the dot lifetime itself was shorter
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designed to prevent participants tracking individual dots through
consecutive frames because the dots carrying the coherent signal
were randomly switched on each frame refresh (they criticized
Milne et al. (2002) for having too long a dot lifetime). On the face
of it, one would expect the briefer presentation time of Del Viva
et al. (2006) to cause more problems for the ASD participants,
but one factor that may be at work is the differential correspon-
dence demands in the two sets of stimuli. As Del Viva et al.
(2006) used two dot colours, larger dots, a slightly longer dot life-
time and a brief overall presentation (too short to initiate an eye
movement) perhaps participants were less likely to mis-combine
signal dots with noise dots. Barlow and Tripathy (1997) discuss
and model correspondence noise in these classes of stimuli in con-
siderable detail. The interesting implication of this observation is
that children with ASDmay be more susceptible to correspondence
noise than their typical counterparts. Some ideas of why this might
be are dealt with in the theory section below.
There are other differences in methodology between Del Viva
et al. (2006) and Pellicano et al. (2005) that may be important. Da-
kin and Frith (2005) pointed out that the use of staircase routines is
widespread in threshold assessments in ASD populations. Staircase
routines have the obvious advantage of speed over constant-stim-
ulus designs, but they are also susceptible to inﬂuence by ﬁnger er-
rors by the participant which may mis-direct the threshold search
in an unusual direction. Pellicano et al. (2005) used a PEST method
to ﬁnd their motion coherence thresholds which converged on the
75% correct point. They averaged all points following the fourth
reversal to determine threshold. Pellicano et al. (2005) also em-
ployed auditory feedback. Del Viva et al. (2006) used a QUEST rou-
tine to alter stimulus levels, but then ﬁtted the resultant
proportion correct data with Weibull functions, also using 75% cor-
rect as the threshold criterion. They did not give any trial-by-trial
feedback to participants and their data collection sessions were
slightly longer. Del Viva et al.’s (2006) method was therefore the
more robust of the two.
This leaves us really with two ways of dealing with the current
contradictions in the data on motion coherence in ASD. One is sim-
ply to indicate that Del Viva et al. (2006) used the most carefully
diagnosed population and the most robust psychophysical tech-
niques and therefore that their result indicating no signiﬁcant dif-
ferences between ASD and control populations should be regarded
as the most reliable. The other is to consider that the other studies
did produce useful and informative results that may be amalgam-
ated by examining the different methodological conditions. Del
Viva et al. (2006) report their motion coherence data as sensitivi-
ties. Converting to coherence thresholds (see Table 1) they are con-
siderably lower than those in other studies (for both ASD and
control populations). As discussed, the larger level of correspon-
dence noise in Pellicano et al. (2005) may have contributed to this
difference. Milne et al. (2006) used quite a long duration and also
required participants to detect which side of the display the oscil-
lating target was presented. These would have presented a greater
challenge to the ASD group, but they also used relatively long dot
lifetimes, which may have allowed for a bit more tracking. It is
curious that the threshold range in the ASD group in Milne et al.
(2006) is actually very similar to that in Milne et al. (2002) when
a signiﬁcant group difference was reported. It seems as though
there was a more heterogeneous ASD population in the later study
and there was a more homogeneous control population. In any
case, the correspondence noise argument would suggest a result
for Milne et al. (2006) between the extremes set by Del Viva
et al. (2006) and Pellicano et al. (2005). Spencer and O’Brien
(2006) split their ASD population into Asperger and autism groups
(a potential confound in other studies). Overall their coherence
thresholds were much higher than the other studies (see Table1), probably due to the higher dot density and larger number of
dots in the display.
In sum, it seems as though motion correspondence, the ‘‘purity”
of the ASD population and the psychophysical methodology, can go
a long way towards explaining the discrepancies in the published
data on motion coherence in ASD.
6.6. Optic ﬂow
Gepner, Mestre, Masson, and de Schonen (1996b) were the ﬁrst
to suggest that there might be difﬁculties with motion perception
in ASD populations. When children with ASD were asked to stand
on a force platform and were presented with a large optic ﬂow
ﬁeld, they were less posturally reactive to the motion than typi-
cally developing controls. A follow-up study showed additional dif-
ferences between a small number of children with autism and a
developmental delay, who were still less posturally reactive, and
another small group with Asperger Syndrome (and typical IQ)
who were more posturally reactive than typical controls (Gepner
& Mestre, 2002). Clearly this result may involve both unusual re-
sponses to optic ﬂow information and/or abnormal postural con-
trol (Milne et al., 2005). However, the methodology of both
Gepner et al. (1996b) and Gepner and Mestre (2002) has been
heavily criticized by Jarrold and Scott-Samuel (2005). Furthermore,
Del Viva et al. (2006), who also measured responses to optic ﬂow
stimuli in the study discussed in detail above, found no differences
between ASD and control groups.
6.7. Biological motion
‘‘Biological motion” refers to the representation of human or
animal actions using point-light displays (PLDs), generated by
placing lights or reﬂective patches onto key anatomical points of
a moving actor and then ﬁlming the result (Johannsson, 1973;
see Blake & Shiffrar, 2007, for a review).
Moore, Hobson, and Lee (1997) presented 5- and 10-point PLDs
depicting a walking person and various moving household objects
(e.g. scissors opening and closing) to a group of 17 children/adoles-
cents with autism (age 10–19 years). The control group was
matched in CA and performance on the BPVS. As all of the ASD
group had impaired language processing, the control group were
learning disabled although not diagnosed with ASD. Stimulus pre-
sentation accumulated gradually from 40 ms to 5000 ms. Partici-
pants were asked to ‘‘name what the dots are stuck to”.
Psychometric functions showed the number of participants in the
sample that were able to name the object correctly as a function
of time, so they were in some sense comparable to average reaction
times, although the cumulative presentation method meant that
the total exposure time to each stimulus was also cumulative.
Moore et al. (1997) reported that there were no signiﬁcant differ-
ences in performance between ASD group and controls for this
task, either with point-light walkers or with the moving objects,
but they found that the ASD group did have difﬁculty with sponta-
neously describing and recognizing portrayals of emotion in PLDs,
despite being able to accurately describe the mechanics of the mo-
tion itself. Moore et al. (1997) therefore suggested that the visual
processing of biological motion is intact in ASD, but that the prob-
lems come with the interpretation of the internal states of others.
Blake et al. (2003) questioned the results of Moore et al. (1997),
arguing that the verbal report responses and cumulative presenta-
tions were susceptible to bias. Blake et al. (2003) used a more ro-
bust and conventional psychophysical procedure: a 12-point-
light actor performed a familiar activity (e.g. running or jumping),
but each motion sequence also had a ‘‘phase scrambled” version in
which dots underwent the same motion trajectory but offset by a
random temporal phase difference. Previous work (Bertenthal &
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motion, diminishes the ability of observers to organize a point-
light display into a human activity. The advantage of comparing
performance with these two stimulus variants is that the low-level
visual structure of the stimuli is the same, the only difference being
the relationships between the dots. Blake et al. (2003) calculated a
d0 score for the biological motion task and found that their typically
developing group performed signiﬁcantly better in this task than
their ASD group with mean d0 of close to 2.5 and close to 1, respec-
tively. This is despite the two groups showing equivalent perfor-
mance on a control ‘‘pathﬁnder” task (discussed above). In
addition, Blake et al. (2003) plotted the individual d0 scores for
the ASD group as a function of their ‘‘level” of autism as measured
by the ADOS and CARS tests and found a signiﬁcant negative corre-
lation, although there was also a correlation, only within the ASD
group, with MA. Note that some 25% (4/16) of Blake et al.’s
(2003) original ASD sample could not complete the biological mo-
tion task and 3 of these could not complete the form task either.
These were all children with lower scores on a test of expressive
language.
What are the potential causes for the discrepant results be-
tween Blake et al. (2003) and Moore et al. (1997)? The Blake
et al. (2003) ASD sample was younger than that of Moore et al.
(1997), being between 8 and 10 years old, rather than averaging
14 years, and were diagnosed more robustly. The control group
was also younger, and matched on CA to the ASD sample’s MA.
The main difference, however, was the nature of the stimuli. Blake
et al.’s (2003) participants were given a 1-s presentation of a ran-
domized stimulus, rather than a cumulative presentation of the
same stimulus repeated until person identiﬁcation was successful.
Based on these results, we might expect children with ASD to take
longer to recognize human forms deﬁned by PLDs. In agreement
with this, Annaz et al. (submitted for publication), also using 1-s
presentation times, have shown that, at a CA of 12 years, TD chil-
dren are better than ASD children in discriminating intact from
scrambled displays. Moreover, there is a ﬂat developmental trajec-
tory from 5 to 12 years for the ASD group and near identical perfor-
mance of the TD and ASD groups at 5 years of age.
Hubert et al. (2007) looked at the age question by presenting
the stimuli used by Moore et al. (1997) to a group of adults with
HFA/AS and IQ-matched controls. There were four sets of PLD se-
quences, each deﬁning a different motion category: 10 were
‘‘actions” (e.g. hopping, running), 5 were ‘‘subjective states” (e.g.
bored, itchy), 5 were ‘‘emotional states” (e.g. surprised, sad) and
5 were object motions (e.g. ball rotating, ironing board opening
and closing). Signiﬁcant performance differences between groups
were only found for the emotional states, which Hubert et al.
(2007) argued was consistent with Moore et al.’s (1997) results.
However, it should also be noted that whilst none of the other con-
ditions reached signiﬁcance there were larger variances on the per-
formance of the ASD group in all conditions, and mean
performance was only identical for the object motion condition.
This suggests that the ASD group may have struggled with the task
whenever it involved a human actor. Indeed, the authors reported
a main effect of group following on from their ANOVA, but this is
contaminated by a group-by-condition interaction. Another impor-
tant point about the stimuli of Hubert et al. (2007), and therefore,
by extension, Moore et al. (1997) is that there was no formal at-
tempt to match the speed or complexity of the local motion con-
tent of the stimuli. In other words, the ASD group may have
found the object motion easiest and the human motion harder
simply because the motion signal was more complex, with more
non-rigid relationships between point-light stimulus components.
A ﬁnal note of concern is the subjectivity of the response assess-
ment, given that participants were asked to describe the motion,
which was then judged by the experimenter as being an appropri-ate or inappropriate description. Whilst the anecdotal evidence of
the rather mechanical descriptions of emotional actions by the ASD
group are persuasive, it is less clear how well the descriptions of
actions in the other conditions matched. Similar conclusions were
reached in a follow-up paper by the same group (Parron et al.,
2008).
Recent fMRI studies by Herrington et al. (2007) and Freitag et al.
(2008) provide converging evidence on the neural processing of
biological motion in ASD populations. The participants in Herring-
ton et al. (2007) were a group of 10 adult males diagnosed with AS
and 10 age-, sex- and IQ-matched controls. The participants in Fre-
itag et al. (2008) were a carefully diagnosed group of 15 adoles-
cents with HFA and controls matched for age, sex and IQ. The
task used by Herrington et al. (2007) was to identify a 1s display
as either intact or scrambled, and the synthetic Cutting algorithm
(Cutting, 1978) was used to generate the 13-point intact displays
with scrambling done by vertical displacement of a point’s original
location by a random distance. The task used by Freitag et al.
(2008) was to identify a 1.5 s display as either intact or scrambled,
and motion capture data of 80 walkers were used to generate the
15-point intact displays with scrambling done by permuting the
location of the points, and changing the speed of each point to be
equal to the average speed of that point. Herrington et al. (2007)
reported that activity for the intact walker versus baseline was
greater in the control than the ASD population in several regions
including the right middle temporal gyrus. A similar trend in the
middle temporal gyrus was reported by Freitag et al. (2008) in
the contrast of all motions versus baseline. However, they also re-
ported regions with greater activation by the ASD group, including
the postcentral gyri, left hippocampus and middle frontal gyrus.
The study by Freitag et al. (2008) went on to show that the con-
trast of brain activity of intact versus scrambled revealed substan-
tially different patterns of activation for the two populations. For
the control group, when intact biological and scrambled motion
were compared, activations were found bilaterally in parietal, tem-
poral and frontal lobes as well as basal ganglia and insula. The acti-
vation network included the right Superior Temporal Sulcus (STS),
which is known to be a central structure in biological motion pro-
cessing (see Puce & Perrett, 2003). In contrast, the ASD group
showed less activated clusters overall. What activations there were
were primarily in the left hemisphere in parieto-temporal (limbic)
and frontal areas as well as basal ganglia. In the right hemisphere,
activations speciﬁc for biological motion were found only in the
limbic system and Thalamus. Freitag et al. (2008) argue strongly
that the processing of biological motion stimuli by people with
ASD is very different from that of typical controls. Whilst the
ASD group was capable of discriminating the biological motion
from scrambled motion they seemed to be doing it using a differ-
ent network of brain regions.
To summarise, the data on biological motion are consistent with
a low-level difﬁculty with motion processing feeding through and
complicating the interpretation of biological motion stimuli, espe-
cially when they present complex motions like human point-like
walkers. However, the ease with which typical observers can attri-
bute emotions and feelings to these curiously sparse stimuli is not
present in ASD populations, and it even seems as though the brain
circuits used for processing these stimuli are different, beyond
low-level motion areas.
Among many areas of potential further development in biolog-
ical motion perception in ASD one concerns the threshold for rec-
ognition. A possible interpretation of the results of Herrington et al.
(2007) and Freitag et al. (2008) is that the stimuli were less salient
for the ASD group: in other words the position on the recognition
psychometric function was different for ASD and control groups. If,
rather than simply presenting the same stimulus for the same
duration to both groups the stimulus was somehow equated for
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would they now be much more comparable? The second issue is
the extent to which the hierarchy of difﬁculty in structure-from-
motion tasks demonstrated by the results of Moore et al. (1997),
Hubert et al. (2007) and Parron et al. (2008) are due to the in-
creased complexity of point-light human stimuli which depict such
abstract notions as internal states and emotions or whether there
is some sort of top-down enhancement mechanism for these types
of stimuli which is lacking or deﬁcient in ASD populations.6.8. Animacy
A seminal study by Heider and Simmel (1944) demonstrated
that typical individuals readily endow simple animated shapes
with thoughts, feelings, and intentions. The perception of animacy
in ASD has received a considerable amount of attention. Whilst this
is arguably outside the domain of vision science per se, it has raised
some relevant questions about the interpretation of visual motion
information which will be covered brieﬂy. First of all, as with bio-
logical motion, there is a consensus that all age groups with ASD
appear to have difﬁculty interpreting animations to which typical
observers attribute social content. However, this difﬁculty is a sub-
tle one and seems to be conﬁned to paradigms in which an ex-
tended verbal response is required. The precise deﬁcit seems to
be in the appropriateness of the language used to describe these
animations. In particular, although the descriptions can be seman-
tically elaborate, they tend not to include the same socially based
vocabulary as typical descriptions (Abell, Happé, & Frith, 2000;
Bowler & Thommen, 2000; Campbell et al., 2006; Castelli, Frith,
Happé, & Frith, 2002; Klin, 2000; Salter, Seigal, Claxton, Lawrence,
& Skuse, 2008). At the same time, participants with ASD do seem
able to distinguish propelled from self-propelled motion and ani-
macy from non-animacy, although possibly with developmental
delay or a training requirement (Bowler & Thommen, 2000; John-
son & Rakison, 2006; Rutherford, Pennington, & Rogers, 2006). Fur-
thermore, relatively elaborate animations which have explanations
in physical, rather than social, terms, seem to be interpreted with
relative ease (Klin & Jones, 2006). Castelli et al. (2002) have postu-
lated that problems associated with interpreting these animated
displays, and with social understanding in general, in ASD, are a re-
sult of the neural activity evoked in extra-striate visual cortex fail-
ing to transmit to the ‘‘social brain” regions of the STS, Temporal
lobe and pre-frontal cortex.
However, a confound appears to run throughout these experi-
ments. The key question is what makes an animation ‘‘social”?
We know that the distinction is partly based on whether or not
the agents appear to be self-propelled (Bowler & Thommen,
2000), but there are also aspects of the motion trajectory and the
relationships between the trajectories of the agents that are crucial
to the interpretation. None of the studies so far has formally
matched the motion content of their animacy displays when com-
paring ‘‘social” versus ‘‘non-social” animation. Castelli et al. (2002)
report no differences in MT/V5 activation in their PET study, but
this is not really adequate. Klin and Jones’ (2006) space animation
appears to be complex, but the physics of this motion sequence
would probably be familiar to boys who are experienced with con-
temporary video games. Rutherford et al.’s (2006) study points to
the importance of training and motivation as well. Could it be that
the problem with so-called ‘‘social” animations is that the com-
plexity of the trajectories and inter-relationships between moving
agents is higher and therefore more difﬁcult to interpret? So the
difﬁculty is not with the ‘‘socialness” per se but with the subtlety
of the information structure in the displays which, somehow, typ-
ical observers pick up automatically during development but
which observers with ASD need focused training with.6.9. Visuomotor control
Gowen, Stanley, and Miall (2008) compared imitation behav-
iour in adults with ASD to CA- and IQ-matched controls on a task
that involved making simple movements back and forth in the ver-
tical or horizontal directions while viewing congruent (same
movement direction) or incongruent (orthogonal movement direc-
tion) displays. These displays took the visual form of either an ac-
tual other person making the movements, or the motion of a single
dot that was animated by a real movement recording, or a single
dot that moved at constant velocity that instantaneously changed
directions at the extremes. Results showed that the performance
of both groups showed a signiﬁcant interference effect for all con-
ditions, however the ASD group did show the effect strongest when
viewing the movements of an actual person. These results demon-
strate that, for both groups, observing others’ movements will
interfere with one’s own movement production but suggest that
overall, the visuomotor integration processes are not identical be-
tween groups.7. Perception of faces and objects
One of the most-studied, and heavily reviewed, areas of visual
processing in ASD is face processing (for recent reviews see Behr-
mann, Thomas, & Humphreys, 2006b; Dawson, Webb, & McPart-
land, 2005a; Golarai, Grill-Spector, & Reiss, 2006; Jemel, Mottron,
& Dawson, 2006; Sasson, 2006). This is unsurprising, given the
usual characterization of ASD as a social deﬁcit, and faces being
arguably the most ‘‘social” of visual stimuli. Here we deal with ob-
ject processing as well, because an object-based task is often used
as a control in studies of face processing.7.1. Early studies
In the ﬁrst detailed study of face processing in ASD, participants
were tested on their ability to recognize isolated features of known
peers from grayscale photographs of their faces (Langdell, 1978).
Two ASD groups were used: a ‘‘younger” group, aged about
10 years and an ‘‘older” group aged about 14 years. Each ASD group
was matched with three different control groups: two typical con-
trol groups matched on either MA (and therefore much younger,
being about 6 and 8 years old, respectively) or CA; a third control
group was learning disabled and was matched on both CA and
IQ. Note that the mean IQ of these ASD groups was quite low, at
60 and 63, respectively, making them both below the cut-off for
learning disability themselves. It was found that both ASD groups
were better able to use the lower part of the face for identiﬁcation
purposes than controls. The older ASD group was also less affected
by inversion than the other experimental groups. Langdell’s (1978)
discussion of the results focused on two issues. First, did his data
suggest that children with ASD tend to regard the face simply as
a complex object, without the social relevance invested in it by
typical children (in Langdell’s words as a ‘‘pure pattern” rather
than a ‘‘social pattern”)? Second, was there evidence for what he
termed ‘‘asocial looking” (i.e. ﬁxating on the ‘‘wrong” part of the
face), and did this relate to the well-known phenomenon of gaze
avoidance in ASD (Hutt & Ounstead, 1966)? These ideas continue
to reverberate through the literature on face processing in ASD to
the present day.
The next major development in the ﬁeld was a landmark series
of studies by Peter Hobson and his co-workers at the Institute of
Psychiatry in London (Hobson, 1986a, 1986b, 1987; Hobson, Ous-
ton, & Lee, 1988a, 1988b, 1989; Weeks & Hobson, 1987) on the
theme of emotion recognition. Weeks and Hobson (1987) asked
children with ASD and VMA-matched learning-disabled controls
Fig. 4. Slide from the ‘‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test (Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001a, 2001b). Reproduced from the actual test with permission of the Autism
Research Centre, University of Cambridge.
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not) or type of hat (ﬂoppy or woollen). Most children with ASD
sorted by type of hat in preference to facial expression (see also
Jennings, 1973). Hobson et al. (1988a) found that children with
ASD had difﬁculty in matching basic facial expressions (happy, un-
happy, angry and scared) across different individuals when pre-
sented with photographs of faces, or parts of faces, taken from
the classic set of Ekman and Friesen (1975). The childrens’ perfor-
mance in identity and emotion sorting was also less affected than
controls by changes in face orientation, consistent with Langdell
(1978). Hence, by the late 1980s, the consensus was that children
with ASD tend to regard faces as less ‘‘special” objects than either
typical, or learning-disabled children (with equivalent verbal abil-
ities), and that there were particular problems with the recognition
of emotional facial expressions. There were no similar difﬁculties
with non-social stimuli like visual scenes or objects (Hobson
et al., 1989). How has this consensus been altered by more recent
studies?
7.2. Is Face recognition impaired in ASD?
Face recognition is one of the most basic of face-processing
skills. Whilst there is a considerable body of evidence that individ-
uals with ASD demonstrate impairments in facial identity-based
tasks (Boucher & Lewis, 1992; Boucher, Lewis, & Collis, 1998;
Critchley et al., 2000; Curby, Schyns, Gosselin, & Gauthier, 2003;
Davies, Bishop, Manstead, & Tantam, 1994; Dawson et al., 2002a;
De Gelder, Vroomen, & van der Heide, 1991; Gepner, de Gelder,
& de Schonen, 1996a; Hauck, Fein, Maltby, Waterhouse, & Fein-
stein, 1998; Jambaque, Mottron, Ponsot, & Chiron, 1998; Klin
et al., 1999; Langdell, 1978; Teunisse & de Gelder, 1994; Ashwin,
Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2005; Dalton et al., 2005; Riby, Doh-
erty-Sneddon, & Bruce, 2009), a signiﬁcant number of studies have
disputed this ﬁnding, especially when the faces are familiar
(Adolphs, Sears, & Piven, 2001; Barton et al., 2004; Braverman,
Fein, Lucci, & Waterhouse, 1989; Celani, Battachi, & Arcidiacono,
1999; Chawarska & Volkmar, 2007; Davies et al., 1994; Deruelle,
Rondan, Gepner, & Tardif, 2004; Gepner et al., 1996a; Ozonoff, Pen-
nington, & Rogers, 1990; Volkmar, Sparrow, Rende, & Cohen, 1989;
Wilson, Pascalis, & Blades, 2007). The evidence is, therefore, mixed.
7.3. Are there particular problems with emotional facial expressions in
ASD?
Difﬁculties in the interpretation of facial expressions are often
associated with ASD, but the scientiﬁc evidence for this difﬁculty
is again remarkably mixed (for a review, see Jemel et al., 2006).
Studies which report difﬁculties with various aspects of facial
expression processing by individuals with ASD are Hobson
(1986a, 1986b, 1987), Weeks and Hobson (1987), Gioia and Brosg-
ole (1988), Hobson et al. (1988a, 1989), Braverman et al. (1989),
McDonald et al. (1989), Tantam, Monagham, Nicholson, and Stir-
ling (1989), Ozonoff et al. (1990), de Gelder et al. (1991), Capps,
Yirmiya, and Sigman (1992), Sigman, Kasari, Kwon, and Yirmiya
(1992), Baron-Cohen, Spitz, and Cross (1993), Davies et al.
(1994), Gepner et al. (1996a), Loveland et al. (1997), Celani et al.
(1999), Critchley et al. (2000), Grossman, Klin, Carter, and Volkmar
(2000), Pelphrey et al. (2002), Ogai et al. (2003), Deruelle et al.
(2004), Dalton et al. (2005), Hefter, Manoach, and Barton (2005),
Ashwin, Chapman, Colle, and Baron-Cohen (2006a), Ashwin,
Wheelwright, and Baron-Cohen (2006b), Boraston, Blakemore,
Chilvers, and Skuse (2007), Humphreys, Minshew, Leonard, and
Behrmann (2007), Mazefsky and Oswald (2007), Gross (2008),
Wright et al. (2008). Some studies suggest speciﬁc deﬁcits with
particular emotional expressions such as fear (De Jong, van Engel-
und, & Kemner, 2008; Pelphrey et al., 2002), sadness (Borastonet al., 2007), or ‘‘negative” expressions (Ashwin et al., 2006a;
Humphreys et al., 2007). Adolphs et al. (2001) showed that their
small sample of adults with ASD did not differ signiﬁcantly from
controls in their ability to discriminate facial expressions, and were
only mildly impaired in the recognition of basic emotions from
faces. However, they did tend to mislabel the approachability
and trustworthiness of faces, suggesting a parallel with amygdalar
damage (Adolphs et al., 2001; Ashwin et al., 2006a).
A number of other studies have failed to ﬁnd any dysfunction
for high-functioning groups when the emotions are ‘‘basic”, such
as happiness, sadness, anger and disgust (Baron-Cohen, Wheel-
wright, & Jolliffe, 1997; Baron-Cohen et al., 1993; Davies et al.,
1994; Volkmar et al., 1989b; Adolphs et al., 2001; Gepner, Deruelle,
& Grynfeltt, 2001; Grossman et al., 2000; Hubl et al., 2003; Love-
land et al., 1997; Piggot et al., 2004; Ashwin et al., 2005; Ashwin
et al., 2006b; Castelli, 2005). Kätsyri, Saalasti, Tiipana, von Wendt,
and Sams (2008) found equivalent performance in a basic facial
expression rating task with their adults with AS and controls ex-
cept for when they used an extreme low-pass ﬁlter on the stimulus
(cut-off less than 1.8 cycles per face width).
There is more consistency in the literature that the performance
of ASD populations on ‘‘complex” facial expression recognition is
relatively poor (Adolphs et al., 2001; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a,
1997; Boraston, Corden, Miles, Skuse, & Blakemore, 2008; Klein-
man, Marciano, & Ault, 2001). The ‘‘Reading the mind in the Eyes”
task illustrated in Fig. 4 is a case in point. Even individuals with
HFA and AS struggle with this task, despite being able to deﬁne
the emotional terms involved (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a, 1997b).
A potential concern with this task is Grossman et al.’s (2000) obser-
vation that people with ASD ﬁnd it harder to choose an emotional
match from a verbal description than from a pictorial description.
However, the ‘‘eyes” test has been validated in a number of coun-
tries and adapted to a number of different age groups (see http://
www.autismresearchcentre.com/arc), so it does provide a useful
tool with which to check the facial expression processing capabil-
ities of people at the high functioning end of the autism spectrum.
Those with lower VIQs will obviously have difﬁculty with the
semantic complexity of the verbal descriptions, although there
are tests adapted speciﬁcally for use with children where the lan-
guage demands are less severe. Boraston et al. (2008) found that
their ASD participants were confused by fake and genuine smiles
(where the eye region was giving either conﬂicting or consistent
information) and were ﬁxating less on the eye region of the target
faces. They also found that difﬁculty with this task was correlated
3 Barton et al. (2007), in common with other studies from the same laboratory
(Barton et al., 2004; Hefter et al., 2005) use the clinical speciﬁcation ‘‘Social
Developmental Disorder”, which is a superset of those with Autism Spectrum
Disorder together with those with slightly different symptomology similar to PDD-
NOS.
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ment (Boraston et al., 2008).
One recent study has questioned that individuals with ASD have
problems interpreting facial expressions. Back, Ropar, and Mitchell
(2007) used video clips of complex facial expressions and pre-
sented them to a group of eighteen 10–14-year-old children with
ASD, and found that they performed above chance at naming the
mental state from a choice of four descriptions, but were not as
proﬁcient as controls. However, when the eye region of the faces
was digitally ‘‘frozen”, the ASD group were affected, so they were
clearly using information from the eye region. When the eyes were
isolated and presented alone, the ASD group were as successful as
controls and also when they were presented in the context of the
whole face. Whilst Back et al. (2007) clearly demonstrate that indi-
viduals with ASD are capable of interpreting complex facial expres-
sions under some circumstances one issue of comparison is that
the task was less challenging because the same female actor was
used throughout, whereas with Baron-Cohen et al.’s (2001a) ‘‘eyes”
task there are a number of different faces.
7.4. Discrimination of other facial attributes
A number of studies suggest poorer performance of ASD groups
in gender discrimination tasks based on faces (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1999; Behrmann et al., 2006a; Deruelle et al., 2004; Hobson, 1987;
Hobson et al., 1988a). Notably, gender discrimination is also
thought to depend largely on information located in the eye region
(Gosselin & Schyns, 2001). Hobson (1987) and Gross (2002, 2005,
2008) looked at age discrimination, the latter in human and non-
human faces, and found a deﬁcit in their population of children
with ASD relative to controls. The data on lip-reading are more
equivocal, with two in favour of a relative deﬁcit (Deruelle et al.,
2004; Gepner et al., 1996a), and two against (de Gelder et al.,
1991; Gepner et al., 2001).
7.5. Is there a face processing impairment in ASD?
Jemel et al. (2006) argue, along with Behrmann et al. (2006b)
and Mottron, Dawson, Soulières, Hubert, and Burack (2006), for
an amodal and non-domain-speciﬁc difference in perceptual pro-
cessing characterized by ‘‘locally oriented” perception of faces
without a speciﬁc deﬁcit in perception of global features, face iden-
tity or emotion. Certainly the behavioural data reviewed above
does not provide unquivocal back-up for there being a speciﬁc
face-processing deﬁcit in all individuals diagnosed with ASD,
although it could be argued that this ability is less robust than in
typical populations. Could this fragility have an underlying percep-
tual basis?
7.6. Is object identiﬁcation and recognition spared in ASD?
A general problem with object identiﬁcation and recognition
would potentially contribute to poorer performance in face pro-
cessing tasks, but the object processing abilities of individuals with
ASD are generally reported to be equivalent to those of control
populations (Boucher & Lewis, 1992; Braverman et al., 1989; Da-
vies et al., 1994; Hobson, 1986a, 1986; de Gelder et al., 1991; Tan-
tam et al., 1989 (low IQ group), Celani et al., 1999; Dawson et al.,
2002a; Gepner et al., 1996a, 1996b).
There are only a couple of studies which suggest that ASD pop-
ulations may have problems with some types of object judgement
(Berhmann et al., 2006a; Davies et al., 1994). Behrmann et al.
(2006a) presented their group of adults with HFA with two object
processing tasks. In the ﬁrst they were required to determine
whether two pictures of naturally occurring objects were the same
or different. In the second, the ‘‘Greeble” class of alien-like objectswas used (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). In both cases the ASD group
demonstrated more difﬁculty with ﬁne object discriminations at
the exemplar/individual level, than controls. Behrmann et al.
(2006a) suggested that visual discrimination difﬁculties are not
conﬁned to social objects like faces, but may reﬂect more general
anomalies in visual processing.
7.7. Are faces ‘‘special” for individuals with ASD? The cases of inversion
and Thatcherisation
It is generally thought that faces are a ‘‘special” class of objects
for the typical visual system, with their own dedicated neural pro-
cessing system (see below). One of the perceptual indicators of this
specialness is that faces are harder to recognize upon inversion
than other objects. Individuals with ASD appear able to distinguish
faces from non-faces (Ashwin, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, O’Rior-
dan, & Bullmore, 2007; Volkmar et al., 1989), but Langdell’s (1978)
original suggestion that children with ASD are less affected by fa-
cial inversion has received only mixed support. Tantam et al.
(1989) and Van der Geest, Kemner, Verbaten, and van Engelund
(2002) argued for unusual performance of ASD populations with
inverted faces. Joseph and Tanaka (2003) presented evidence that
children with ASD were more sensitive to image manipulations
in the mouth region than in the eye region of faces, unlike controls,
and that only this sensitivity showed an inversion effect: a partial
replication of Langdell (1978). But most recent studies have shown
signiﬁcant face inversion effects in ASD populations (Barton, Hef-
ter, Cherkasova, & Manoach, 2007; Gross, 2008; Lahaie et al.,
2006; Teunisse & de Gelder, 2003) shifting the balance in favour
of an intact face inversion effect in ASD, at least in high-functioning
groups. There is a possibility that this effect (or, effect absence!)
might be more pronounced in ASD populations with lower IQ (Teu-
nisse & De Gelder, 2003) or, at least, those with poorer face dis-
crimination abilities (Barton, Hefter, Cherkasova, & Manoach,
2007), but there seem to be confounding factors of overall task per-
formance, some of which may not be related to visual processing.
Another related stimulus manipulation is the selective inver-
sion of facial features known as the ‘‘Thatcher Illusion” (Thompson,
1980). Rouse, Donnelly, Hadwin, and Brown (2004) and Riby et al.
(2009) have shown that this illusion is intact in children with ASD.
However, Riby et al. (2009) also manipulated eye and mouth re-
gions separately and found that their group of 10–18-year-old chil-
dren with autism were equally sensitive to ‘‘Thatcherisations” of
the eyes and mouth and did not favour the eyes as the controls did.
7.8. Are faces processed as a collection of individual features in ASD,
rather than as a coherent whole?
‘‘Conﬁgural processing” has been deﬁned as the perception of
relations between features of a stimulus, such as a face, as con-
trasted with ‘‘componential” or ‘‘featural” processing (Maurer, Le
Grand, & Mondloch, 2002). Behrmann et al. (2006a) found that
their group of adults with ASD found it harder to discriminate
masked down (i.e. ‘‘internal features only”) images of faces by
identity and gender than matched controls. Barton et al. (2007)
explicitly compared featural and conﬁgural processing of faces by
manipulating the eye separation or mouth position (conﬁgural)
or eye and mouth colour (featural) properties of face images and
asking their population of SDD3 adults which of three faces simulta-
neously present on screen was the odd one out. Those who were able
Fig. 5. Eye tracking data from Pelphrey et al. (2002). Reproduced with permission of
Springer Science and Business Media.
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relative to controls in this task, but those unable to do famous face
recognition (‘‘SDD-2”) were severely impaired. Notably, however,
they were equally impaired on featural as conﬁgural changes, sug-
gesting that there was no speciﬁc deﬁcit in sensitivity to conﬁgural
changes to faces. Note that, while this experiment was ingenious
there is a small concern that the featural changes were not matched
for discriminability with the featural changes. Teunisse and de Gel-
der (2003) looked at the facial composite effect, where the photo-
graph of a face is split in two along a horizontal axis and
combined with another. When typical participants are asked to spot
whether the top half of this face is the same as that of a simulta-
neously presented target face they are poorer when the composites
are aligned rather than misaligned (Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987).
The ASD group tested by Teunisse and de Gelder (2003) did not show
this effect, although the controls did. However, despite being statis-
tically signiﬁcant, the differences found were quite small. Joseph and
Tanaka (2003) reported a variation on the ‘‘whole-face advantage”
normally found when trying to spot which features of a previously
seen face have been altered. Whereas typical children were more
sensitive to eye substitutions, the ASD group were more sensitive
to mouth substitutions, echoing the results of Langdell (1978). How-
ever, performance was generally quite poor in this task for both ASD
children and controls, only reaching a maximum of 76% correct (con-
trols on eye substitutions). Riby et al. (2009) have also reported that
their ASD group were less sensitive to eye than mouth manipula-
tions in a similar experiment, but Lopez, Donnelly, Hadwin, and Lee-
kam (2004) found that they could generate a whole-face advantage
in their adolescents with ASD by adding a cue to the appropriate
feature.
All in all, there seems to be a large amount of variability in the
data on conﬁgural processing of faces in ASD. Barton et al.’s (2007)
data suggest that this variability may be due to a bimodal split in
the ASD population between those that are quite capable in face
identity processing tasks and those that are not.
7.9. Are face processing difﬁculties in ASD conﬁned to the eye region?
It is commonly asserted that people with ASD have difﬁculty
attending to the eye-region of faces, unlike typical controls (Boras-
ton et al., 2008; Dalton et al., 2005; Gross, 2004; Klin, Jones,
Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002; Pelphrey et al., 2002; Rutherford,
Clements, & Sekuler, 2007a) and/or attend selectively to the mouth
region (Joseph & Tanaka, 2003; Langdell, 1978). Rutherford et al.
(2007a) tested this prediction explicitly by measuring the discrim-
inability of small spatial displacements in the eyes and mouths of
digitally altered images of unfamiliar faces in 16 young adults with
ASD and 19 matched controls. The test images only included the
internal facial features (i.e. no hair or contour features). There were
signiﬁcant differences between ASD and control groups for eye-re-
gion displacements but not for mouth-region displacements. Ruth-
erford et al. (2007a) were able to divide their ASD sample into two
sub-groups: those who performed in a typical fashion and those
who were severely impaired. The key difference between the
sub-groups was in VIQ which was average (100.5) in the typi-
cally-performing sub-group, but below average (85.3) in the group
that experienced more difﬁculty with the eye-region task. Control
experiments provided no evidence for selective attention to the
mouth in the ASD group (cf. Joseph & Tanaka, 2003; Riby et al.,
2009).
A potential criticism of Rutherford et al. (2007a) is that there
was no explicit measurement of eye ﬁxations. However, Pelphrey
et al. (2002) presented ﬁve adult males with autism with Ekman
faces of the six basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, sur-
prise, and disgust) and monitored their eye movements with a
high-precision eye tracker. Participants were asked to view thefaces normally and also to identify the emotion. Stimulus duration
was 2 s and subtended a relatively large visual angle (10.7 deg hor-
izontally and 14.2 deg vertically), presumably to allow plenty of
resolution in the eye movement measurements. They found clear
qualitative differences between the scan paths of their ASD and
control groups (see Fig. 5). In particular, the ASD group did not ﬁx-
ate as much on the eye region as the controls. They were also sig-
niﬁcantly worse at identifying the emotions, particularly the
fearful faces.
This result is particularly signiﬁcant. Smith, Cottrell, Gosselin,
and Schyns (2005) have shown that the eye region is important
for the detection of fear in emotional faces, and the observation
provides a clear reason for the wide range of results found in face
processing and ASD when eye movements are unmeasured on
uncontrolled. As mentioned above, the idea that individuals with
ASD simply look in the wrong place when presented with face
stimuli (and no further instructions) was originally suggested in
Langdell’s (1978) study on face processing in ASD. If this is true
in everyday life then the experience necessary for becoming ‘‘ex-
pert” face processors will not develop, especially if no explicit
instructions are given or if the aversion to viewing the eyes of oth-
ers is particularly strong (Hutt & Ounsted, 1966). Clearly this expe-
riential effect is likely to vary between individuals and may give
rise to the sorts of ability differences in ASD populations reported
by Barton et al. (2004).
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eye gaze to fearful and happy faces, but used the ‘‘Bubbles” method
(Gosselin & Schyns, 2001) to reveal different amounts of informa-
tion from trial to trial, and thereby test the information being used
to perform the task whilst also tracking eye movements. The Bub-
bles technique works by using adaptive control to maintain behav-
ioural performance at a constant level, giving the added advantage
that all participants were performing the task equally well. Spezio
et al. (2007) found that their eight adults with HFA showed less ﬁx-
ation speciﬁcity to the eyes and mouth, a greater tendency to sac-
cade away from the eyes (even when useful information was
present in the eye region) and abnormal directionality of saccades.
Spezio et al.’s (2007) data reinforces the idea that face scanning is
atypical in adults with ASD, which may have a profound inﬂuence
on social functioning.
However, van der Geest et al. (2002) found no signiﬁcant differ-
ences in scan paths or initial ﬁxations to emotional faces with his
sample of 17 children with ASD and Bar-Haim, Shulman, Lamy,
and Reuveni (2006), using a dot-probe paradigm, found no differ-
ences between the relative attentional allocations made to the eyes
and mouth by their group of 10-year-old boys with HFA and con-
trols. A potential factor in the data of both van der Geest et al.
(2002) and Bar-Haim et al. (2006) is the lack of fearful and, in
the latter case, any emotional expressions among the face stimuli.
7.10. Gaze detection
If there are problems with using information from the eye re-
gion of faces in ASD, then it would be expected that eye-gaze
detection might be particularly affected. Leekam, Baron-Cohen,
Perrett, Milders, and Brown (1997) found that the ability of chil-
dren with ASD to discriminate degrees of change in the orientation
of the gaze of an adult from carefully prepared and calibrated pho-
tographs was well matched to their developmental age level, cor-
responding to a displacement of the iris as small as 3.5 arcmin,
although their ability to spontaneously follow the gaze of an exper-
imenter was well below that of controls. Some subsequent studies
have conﬁrmed this result (Kylläinen & Hietanen, 2004; Leekam,
Hunnisett, & Moore, 1998; Warreyn, Roeyers, Oelbandt, & De Gro-
ote, 2005).
Campbell et al. (2006), however, did ﬁnd a speciﬁc deﬁcit in eye
gaze sensitivity in their sample of 11-year-old children with ASD
and carefully matched controls. Their task was likely more chal-
lenging than that of Leekam et al. (1997) in that the gaze displace-
ments were smaller. There were also subtle differences in the
instructions (‘‘Is she looking at you?” rather than ‘‘Where is she
looking?”) which may have had an impact. Even so, Campbell
et al.’s (2006) results do suggest that eye gaze acuity may be
slightly worse in children with ASD. Webster and Potter (2008)
have also suggested that careful measurements of eye gaze acuity
(their smallest deﬂection was 5 deg from the midline) may ﬁnd
subtle differences in eye gaze processing, especially with younger
children.
Swettenham, Condie, Campbell, Milne, and Coleman (2003)
demonstrated that reﬂexive orienting is intact in older children
with ASD (mean age 10 years). Both their control and their ASD
groups were unable to resist following the cue given by the eyes
of a face to a subsequently presented target, even though the cue
was invalid 50% of the time. The effects were also apparent when
the face was presented upside down. This suggests that not only
can children with ASD perceive larger movements of the eyes,
but they can also reﬂexively move their attention to the location
cued by them. Note that in this study, the eyes were actually seen
to move, rather than being presented as a static stimulus with eyes
averted. Reﬂexive orienting to eye movements in ASD have also
been investigated by Okada, Sato, Murai, Kubota, and Toichi(2003), Senju, Tojo, Dairoku, and Hasegawa (2004), Kylliäinen
and Hietanen (2004), Vlamings, Stauder, van Son, and Mottron
(2005), Kemner, Schuller, and van Engelund, 2006, Goldberg et al.
(2008) and Rutherford and Krysko (2008). Although Swettenham
et al. (2003) suggested that the success of their ASD group in using
the eye cue was a developmental effect, Chawarska, Klin, and Volk-
mar (2003) found a similar effect in very young children (2 years)
with autism diagnoses.
Senju, Yaguchi, Tojo, and Hasegawa (2003) looked at the ability
of children with ASD to detect a face with direct eye gaze using the
oddball paradigm. They found that the children with ASD failed to
show a detection advantage when the gaze of the target face was
direct, unlike the typical children, although the performance in
oddball detection for averted gaze was the same. Senju et al.
(2003) argued that children with ASD lack special mechanisms
for detecting direct gaze and thus should not obtain the ‘‘stare-
in-the-crowd” effect (von Grünau & Anston, 1995).
Senju, Hasegawa, and Tojo (2005) extended their previous re-
sult to a visual search paradigm, demonstrating that children with
ASD show no search-time advantage for a face looking directly at
the viewer, rather than a face with averted gaze, unlike control par-
ticipants. However, in a clever additional experiment, Senju et al.
(2005) used schematic pictures of pairs of eyes which maintained
the symmetry cues normally present if a viewer is facing directly
towards you. In this case, a direct gaze effect was observed in the
ASD children, despite there being generally longer reaction times
in the clinical group for all tasks.
Kylliäinen and Hietanen (2006) measured skin conductance re-
sponses (SCR) – an indicator of stress levels – in children with ASD
and controls while viewing an adult face with either straight-ahead
or averted gaze. The SCR responses from the children with ASD
were signiﬁcantly stronger for straight-ahead gaze stimuli than
for averted gaze stimuli, unlike the controls. This result has obvi-
ous implications for the notion that eye contact can be particularly
aversive for people with ASD. Wallace, Coleman, Pascalis, and Bai-
ley (2006) also showed that eye-gaze detection is impaired in
adults with ASD, particularly in the context of the whole face.
Kylliäinen, Brauetigem, Hietanen, Swithenby, and Bailey (2006)
examined MEG responses to faces with different eye-gaze states in
7–12-year-old children. Only subtle differences were found be-
tween these responses and those of normative controls. However,
Grice et al. (2005) found that their sample of young children (mean
age 61 months) and age- and sex-matched TD controls showed sig-
niﬁcantly different High Density ERP responses to faces with direct
and averted gaze. Grice et al. (2005) suggested that their results re-
ﬂected a developmental delay in the processing of eye gaze in ASD.
Elsabbagh et al. (2009) studied EEG responses in infant siblings
of children diagnosed with ASD. Whilst these infant siblings are too
young themselves to receive a diagnosis of ASD, they are at high
risk of developing it, although this will only be known in the future.
Elsabbagh et al. (2009) found that the early ERP components did
not differ between the sibling group and controls, but the later
P400 potential (thought to be a pre-cursor of the adult N170)
showed a prolonged latency in response to direct gaze. Measure-
ments of neural oscillations in the gamma band also showed differ-
ences between the sib-ASD and control groups in response to
direct gaze. This gamma activity was later and less persistent over
the right temporal region in the sib-ASD group. Note that this re-
sult is unlikely to have been affected by the eye-movement arti-
facts which possibly contaminate measurements of gamma band
activity in adults (Yuval-Greenberg et al., 2008).
To summarise this section on eye gaze processing, it is clear that
children and adults with ASD have some sensitivity to eye gaze dif-
ferences in that reﬂexive visual orienting to eye gaze cues seems to
be largely intact, and acuity for modulation in eye gaze is indistin-
guishable from typicals down to about 10 deg away from midline.
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have problems with detecting very ﬁne modulations of eye gaze
(Campbell et al., 2006; Webster & Potter, 2008) and this would
seem to be an interesting area for further investigation with rigor-
ous psychophysical techniques. Another difference noted between
ASD and control groups, which may be related, is that direct gaze
(independent of the symmetry cues provided by differences be-
tween straight-ahead direct and averted gaze) is more problematic
for those on the autism spectrum to process. This is particularly
apparent in the data of Senju et al. (2003, 2005) and the electro-
physiological and magnetoencephalographic studies of eye gaze
processing in ASD and related populations (De Jong et al., 2008;
Elsabbagh et al., 2009).7.11. Neural processing of faces in ASD
7.11.1. Electrophysiological studies
Studies of face and object processing in ASD using EEG have
been reviewed by Dawson et al. (2005). The advantage of this tech-
nique for studying ASD is that it can be used on children who are
too young to take part in psychophysical experiments. Dawson
et al. (2002a) looked at children aged 3–4 years of age with and
without ASD, presenting them with faces of their mothers,
matched unfamiliar faces, photographs of their favourite toy and
photographs of a similar toy whilst monitoring their neural
event-related potentials (ERPs) with high-density EEG. The typical
matched controls showed ERP amplitude differences in potentials
P400 and Nc to both familiar vs. unfamiliar toys and faces, but
the ASD group only showed ERP amplitude modulation in these
components to the toys. These data are clearly consistent with a
face recognition impairment in ASD being present early in life. In
a follow-up study, Dawson, Webb, Carver, Panagiotides, and
McPartland (2004) found weaker differential responses to fear
and neutral faces in ASD children compared to controls. In adoles-
cents and adults with ASD, McPartland, Dawson, Webb, Panagio-
tides, and Carver (2004) found longer latency N170 potential
responses to faces versus non-faces, but equivalent latencies for
objects. O’Connor, Hamm, and Kirk (2005) found delayed P1 and
N170 latencies and smaller N170 amplitudes in adults with AS in
comparison to controls to a range of facial expressions. Curiously,
no such differences were observed between these potentials in a
group of children with AS and their controls. O’Connor, Hamm,
and Kirk (2007) also found N170 delays in AS adults to faces and
face parts, but not to objects. Webb, Dawson, Bernier, and Panagio-
tides (2006) found that 3–4-year-old children with ASD showed
slower ERPs to faces and larger ERP amplitudes to objects than con-
trol children. All of these studies have therefore suggested that the
neural basis of face processing is anomalous in ASD.
Boeschoten, Kenemans, van Engelund, and Kemner (2007) were
interested in the cause of these face processing anomalies. They
measured ERP responses to faces, objects and stimuli for which
children with Pervasive Developmental Disorder4 (PDD) were ‘‘ex-
perts” (e.g. cars, cartoon characters). These images were either low-
or high-pass ﬁltered and displayed upright or inverted in order to get
differential ERP responses. Dipole source localization techniques
were also used to give information about the location of the brain
activity. Conventional ERP analysis revealed no differences between
the responses of these 10–11-year-old children and CA- and IQ-
matched controls. However, the source analysis revealed that the
controls appeared to be using specialist face processing mechanisms
when the faces were dominated by low spatial-frequency (LSF) con-
tent, but the children with PDD were not. The difference came in the
relative amount of frontal and occipital activation to low-pass ﬁl-4 This Dutch group consistently uses PDD groups rather than ASD.tered faces. In the controls frontal sources were activated the most
by LSF faces and occipital sources by HSF faces, but in the PDD group
occipital sources were always the most active. Boeschoten et al.
(2007) argued that their data echoed data from the fMRI literature
showing differential frontal activations to faces in ASD (Dalton
et al., 2005; Pierce, Haist, Sedaghat, & Courchesne, 2004) and were
evidence against the ‘‘reduced expertise” explanation for face-pro-
cessing deﬁcits (Schultz, 2005) and in favour of a lower-level percep-
tual cause. Two potential problems with Boeschoten et al. (2007)
however are that they do not report how well their low- and high-
spatial-frequency stimuli were matched for contrast energy and
there was no ‘‘expertise” comparison for the control group, so the
speciﬁcity of the measured difference for faces is uncertain.
Grice et al. (2001) presented adults with ASD, Williams Syn-
drome and typical controls with upright or inverted colour faces
of adult females whilst monitoring their neural responses with
EEG. In the ASD group they found that the oscillatory potentials
in the so-called gamma band (20–50 Hz), thought to be character-
istic of visual coherence, were reduced in amplitude in the ASD
group (see Tallon-Baudry, Bertrand, Delpuech, & Pernier, 1996). Re-
cent EEG studies have however, suggested that this result may be
unsound and demonstrated that gamma oscillations from EEGwith
the broad-band time–frequency signature indicated in Fig. 1 of
Grice et al. (2001) are likely to be an artifact caused by spiking
potentials from the eyes (see Yuval-Greenberg et al. (2008) and
discussion above).
To date there is one published MEG study of neural responses in
ASD populations to faces (Bailey, Braeutigam, Jousmäki, & Swit-
henby, 2005). This study implicates a processing network with
subtly different timing and localization when adults with ASD view
pictures of faces, possibly indicating unusual activity in the Fusi-
form Gyrus, consistent with many fMRI studies of face processing
in ASD (see below).
7.11.2. Neuroimaging with magnetic resonance
As far as face processing in ASD is concerned, the two main foci
of attention in neuroimaging studies have been the fusiform gyrus
and the amygdala. It is well known that the fusiform gyrus con-
tains a region that appears to be critical to face processing that
has become known as the Fusiform Face Area (FFA) (Kanwisher,
McDermott, & Chun, 1997). It is equally well known that this has
been the focus of a lively debate about whether it really is an area
specialized for face processing or simply for any class of objects
requiring ﬁne discrimination (Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski,
& Gore, 1999). Since the ﬁrst studies in 2000, there have been a
large number of replications of reduced or anomalous activation
of Fusiform Gyrus in both adults and children with ASD during face
processing tasks which might be consistent with a non-existent,
inactive or at least substantially altered FFA (Critchley et al.,
2000; Hall, Szechtman, & Nahmias, 2003; Pierce, Muller, Ambrose,
Allen, & Courchesne, 2001; Schultz et al., 2000 (a PET study), Dap-
retto, Hariri, Sigman, & Bookheimer, 2004; Hubl et al., 2003; Piggot
et al., 2004; Wang, Bailey et al., 2005 (MEG), Dalton et al., 2005;
Grelotti et al., 2005). By 2005 there had been demonstrations of re-
duced FFA activations in ASD in 157 individuals (Schultz, 2005).
The most popular explanation for this observation has been that,
for some reason, the FFA does not develop face specialization in
ASD, but is instead recruited by other objects with which the child
with ASD is interested. The most striking support for this argument
was the child with ASD who was obsessed with the Japanese car-
toon series DigimonTM and whose FFA was apparently active to
these distinctive cartoon characters rather than human faces (Grel-
otti et al., 2005).
However, three studies which used different presentation and
stimulus monitoring techniques suggest that FFA hypo-activation
in ASD might be an epiphenomenon. Pierce et al. (2004) used an
Fig. 6. Figure from Pellicano et al. (2007) showing the layout of the ‘‘face space” and
representative data. Reproduced with permission of Elsevier Ltd.
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faces to engage the attention of ASD participants more in the task.
Pierce et al. (2004) found signiﬁcant activations in what they ar-
gued was the FFA in their small sample of eight adults with ASD.
Hadjikhani et al. (2004b) argued strongly that controlling atten-
tion, and therefore ﬁxation, of the ASD participants was crucial to
ﬁnding FFA activation. They showed that when a prominent ﬁxa-
tion spot was placed in the centre of the display screen, the face
stimuli were large (20 deg in diameter), participants were not
asked to make a discrimination but passively monitor the display,
and high-resolution (3T) scanning was used, signiﬁcant bilateral
activations of the Fusiform Gyrus were obtained which did not
overlap with object processing regions. Dalton et al. (2005), who
explicitly monitored eye movements during the scanning of their
adolescents with ASD, found that activation of the fusiform gyrus
in their face processing task correlated with eye movements to
the appropriate parts of the face in the ASD participants, but did
not observe the same correlations in the control participants. Thus,
if hypo-activation of FFA is to be demonstrated convincingly in
ASD, it must be found when ﬁxation or eye movements are
controlled.
The other brain region of particular interest for face processing
in ASD has been the amygdala (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 2000;
Schultz, 2005). As with the FFA, early neuroimaging evidence
was in agreement that the amygdala was hypo-active during the
viewing of (normally) emotional facial expressions (Baron-Cohen
et al., 1999; Critchley et al., 2000; Pierce, Muller, Ambrose, Allen,
& Courchesne, 2001). More-recent data has, however, been more
circumspect. Wang, Dapretto, Hariri, Sigman, and Bookheimer
(2004) found hypo-activation, but it was a small effect. Grelotti
et al. (2005) found hypo-activation for emotional faces in their case
study of ASD, but found signiﬁcant activation for the DigimonTM
characters that their participant was obsessed with. Welchew
et al. (2005) reported reduced functional connectivity between
the amygdala and other brain areas, but admitted that ﬁndings
in this area can be highly task-dependent. Ashwin et al. (2007) re-
ported reduced activation of amygdala together with higher activa-
tions in Superior Temporal Sulcus, and other brain regions, relative
to controls. However, three studies, those of Ogai et al. (2003),
Pierce et al. (2004) and Piggot et al. (2004), failed to ﬁnd any signif-
icant differences in amygdala activation for the ASD samples com-
pared to controls. Note that Piggot et al.’s (2004) participants were
relatively young (age range 9–14 years) compared with other stud-
ies, which mainly focus on adults. One study, that of Dalton et al.
(2005), actually found higher activations of the amygdala in their
ASD sample. They argued that faces, when properly ﬁxated by indi-
viduals with ASD (note that their ASD sample was also quite young,
with a mean age of 15), actually cause hyperarousal of the amyg-
dala, and that this effect may be a factor in the well known symp-
tom of gaze aversion.
Whilst the weight of evidence, in terms of number of replica-
tions, currently favours the hypo-arousal camp, it seems that it is
really too early to start building theories of the development of
ASD which rely on this result. Dalton et al.’s (2005) study, together
with Ogai et al. (2003), Pierce et al. (2004) and Piggot et al. (2004)
suggest that it is possible to obtain functional activations of the
amygdala in individuals with ASD, given appropriate control of
the participant (with regard to ﬁxation) and appropriate levels of
stimulation (familiar or highly evocative faces). It could simply
be that previous demonstrations of hypo-arousal have not really
stimulated this region hard enough to get a response. Having said
that, a threshold difference of this sort, if it is apparent under the
conditions of everyday life, is bound to have functional conse-
quences, depending on what the precise function of the amygdala
is in typical populations (Diekhof, Falkai, & Gruber, 2008; Pessoa,
2008; Schaefer & Gray, 2007).7.12. Is adaptation to faces anomalous in ASD?
Pellicano, Jeffery, Burr, and Rhodes (2007) investigated another
face-speciﬁc phenomenon in ASD, the face-identity aftereffect, in
which adaptation to a particular face biases perception towards
the ‘‘opposite” identity (determined using face-averaging and
morphing techniques, see Leopold, O’Toole, Vetter, and Blanz
(2001) and Fig. 6). After a training session with the two unfamiliar
target faces, participants were asked to group morphs of different
strengths into ‘‘teams” corresponding to each target. This mea-
sured baseline performance. Presentation time was 400 ms. The
adaptation trial was then introduced in the context of a scenario
involving robbers of a jewellery store. The adaptation period was
5 s per trial. The adaptation face was the ‘‘anti-face” of one of the
two target faces. Pellicano et al. (2007) found that their ASD group
(children aged 8–13 years) could discriminate between the two
target faces as well as matched controls in the baseline condition,
but showed considerably less adaptation to the anti-faces with the
amount of adaptation correlating with the child’s symptomatology,
as measured by the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ;
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face-identiﬁcation judgements after adaptation, which argues
against a more general worsening of performance due to the adap-
tation process.
Pellicano et al. (2007) used reliably diagnosed ASD groups and
forced-choice psychophysics, although the observed effects were
small and eye movements were not monitored directly during task
performance. An obvious potential criticism of the Pellicano et al.
(2007) result is that the ASD group simply did not ﬁxate appropri-
ately on the adaptation stimulus, but the experimenters used a rel-
atively short adaptation period of 5 s, and did their best to
encourage the children to ﬁxate during this time.
Pellicano et al.’s (2007) ﬁndings suggest that visual adaptation
mechanisms may be affected in ASD, and possibly not in a face-
speciﬁc way. They argue that this difﬁculty may reﬂect a problem
with generalization across stimuli, which has been highlighted in
some theoretical approaches to ASD (Frith, 1989; Klinger & Daw-
son, 2001; Plaisted, 2001).7.13. Face and object processing in ASD – summary
The literature on face processing in ASD presents quite a confus-
ing picture, with very few clear results to hang potential theories
on. There is evidence that individuals with ASD tend to process
the eye region of faces less effectively than typical individuals
(e.g. Spezio et al., 2007), and that this difﬁculty may arise from a
tendency not to look at the eye region of faces unless speciﬁcally
instructed to (Dalton et al., 2005; Pehplrey et al., 2002). This ten-
dency could, in turn, arise from the well known aversion to direct
gaze in ASD.
Rutherford et al. (2007a) highlight the importance of the VIQ
scores of their ASD group in their ability to perform face eye-region
spatial discriminations. This ﬁnding echoes previous work on facial
expression tasks, where ASD groups were found not to be impaired
relative to VMA-matched controls (e.g. Braverman et al., 1989;
Ozonoff et al., 2000; discussed further in Jemel et al., 2006). If ver-
bal comprehension ability is closely linked with facial interpreta-
tion judgements, then it is possible that previous failures or
successes in ﬁnding face-processing deﬁcits in ASD groups have
been due to using different mixtures of verbal ability within the
sample. If it proves to be true that verbal comprehension ability
is a good predictor of face-processing deﬁcits in ASD then it will
be interesting to determine whether this may be a cause or a con-
sequence. Barton et al.’s (2004, 2007) differential ﬁndings with
groups differing in their famous face recognition abilities also sug-
gests that there are a broad range of face processing abilities in ASD
populations which must be divided further in order to provide
meaningful results. Hidden correlations, possibly with the amount
of exposure to magazines or television, may underlie these differ-
ential abilities. There is also the possibility that some more general
visual processing deﬁcit with object discrimination (Behrmann
et al., 2006a), eye gaze acuity (Campbell et al., 2006; Webster &
Potter, 2008) or adaptation processes (Pellicano et al., 2007) might
be involved.
A ﬁnal potential factor is suggested by Deruelle et al.’s (2004)
result that participants with ASD made more errors in a face
matching task when presented with low-pass-, rather than high-
pass-ﬁltered face stimuli. This tendency to use the higher, rather
than the lower, spatial frequency information might cause particu-
lar problems when face stimuli are far away, although it would de-
pend on whether or not the issue is with spatial frequency per se, or
the relative spatial frequency content of the face. Could the stimuli
in many demonstrations of poor face processing in ASD simply
have been too small? There has been no explicit study of the role
of viewing distance on face processing in ASD to ﬁnd this out,and ideally this would need to be combined with spatial frequency
ﬁltering to address the normalization problem.8. Visual search and attention
8.1. Embedded ﬁgures
It has been commented on for some time that both children and
adults with ASD appear to be sensitive to minute changes in their
environment which are often invisible to, or at least unnoticed by,
their typical peers (Wing, 1976). Shah and Frith (1983) measured
this ability directly using the ‘‘Embedded Figures Test” (EFT; Wit-
kin, Oltman, Raskin, & Karp, 1971). This test, which forms a part
of many IQ test batteries, requires the individual under test to ﬁnd
a simple ﬁgure, such as a triangle, in a complicated pattern that
makes up a real image, such as a pram (‘‘stroller” for US readers;
see Fig. 7). Shah and Frith (1983) compared the performance in this
task of 20 children with autism (8–18 years, mean  13 years), to
20 children with learning disabilities, but matched in MA, and 20
typical children with a lower CA (about 9) to match the MAs of
the two clinical groups. They found that not only was the perfor-
mance of the children with autism signiﬁcantly higher than that
of the controls, but as good as, if not slightly better than, that ex-
pected of children matching their CA. They also mentioned that
the location of the embedded ﬁgure by the children with autism
was often immediate, without any obvious need for visual search
(hence the title of their paper: ‘‘an islet of ability in autistic chil-
dren” (Shah & Frith, 1983)). More recent studies by Ropar and
Mitchell (2001), Pellicano et al. (2005), Jarrold, Gilchrist, and Bend-
er (2005), De Jonge, Kemner, and van Engelund (2006) and Falter,
Plaisted, and Davis (2008) have conﬁrmed and extended the Shah
and Frith (1983) result. Edgin and Pennington (2005) measured
performance in the Children’s version of the EFT in a group of chil-
dren with ASD with ages ranging from 7 to 17. It was found that
the performance advantage over controls (measured in terms of
reaction time) for the ASD group was largest with the younger chil-
dren, but gradually decreased with increasing age until the two
groups matched at the top of the age band.
Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1997) performed a careful study on
adults with ASD and matched controls, using the adult version of
the EFT. They characterized the performance of their participants
largely in terms of ‘‘completion” time, asking them to draw around
the embedded object and including this drawing time in their per-
formance measure. They also supported Shah and Frith (1983) in
that their ASD group (both those with classic HFA and those with
AS) was almost twice as fast, on average, as typical controls
matched on IQ, although there were no signiﬁcant differences in
accuracy, all participants being quite close to ceiling in the task.
Superior or equivalent performance in the EFT in adults with ASD
has been conﬁrmed by Bölte et al. (2007).
Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1997) followed up this behavioural
paper with a fMRI study of the same cohort of participants (Ring
et al., 1999). It was found that activations in control participants
were more extensive and included pre-frontal cortical areas that
were not recruited in the ASD group. The ASD group, however,
demonstrated greater activation in occipito-temporal regions. Ring
et al. (1999) suggested that the frontal activations may indicate the
involvement of working memory systems in solving the task but
that the ASD group only used visual areas. Manjaly et al. (2007)
and Lee et al. (2007) have also reported unusual brain activations
in ASD groups whilst they performed the EFT, or an analogue
thereof.
The notion of superior performance of individuals with ASD in
the EFT or its analogues has been challenged in a number of studies
(Brian & Bryson, 1996; Kaland, Mortensen, & Smith, 2007; Ozonoff,
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provided a convincing disconﬁrmation of either the Shah and Frith
(1983) or the Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1997) results. Schlooz et al.
(2006) do, however, provide a good summary of the conditions un-
der which this superior performance is found. Jolliffe and Baron-
Cohen (1997) emphasise that a key element of the procedure in
the adult version of the task is to require participants to view
and describe the overall design before attempting to locate the
embedded ﬁgure. This obviously encourages a more ‘‘global” ap-
proach to the overall design and may impair detailed search in
those with a tendency to process more globally anyway. This could
be described as a form of priming at the global (i.e. overall pattern)
level which individuals with ASD are less prone to.
The balance of evidence, therefore, seems to favour superior
performance in the Embedded Figures Task by individuals on the
autism spectrum, relative to IQ- or MA-matched controls. Further-
more, the neuroimaging evidence suggests that individuals with
ASD employ different neural circuits to solve this task as compared
to typical individuals.
8.2. Block design
The Block design sub-test (BDT) forms a part of many standard
IQ test batteries (e.g. Wechsler, 1974, 1981). There have been
numerous previous demonstrations of superior performance by
ASD populations in the BDT relative to other IQ sub-tests (e.g. Lock-
yer & Rutter, 1970; Venter, Lord, & Schopler, 1992). The task in-
volves constructing a particular bichromatic pattern from a ﬁxed
number of (identical) blocks with bichromatic sub-patterns on
each face as quickly as possible (see Fig. 7). In Shah and Frith’s
(1993) study, there were 40 patterns in total and both accuracy
and time to construct were measured. Shah and Frith (1993) used
ﬁve different groups of participants: High (85+) and low IQ (below
85) participants with autism, both mean age 18 years; a typical
group of children with typical IQ, mean age 16 years; a younger
group of typical children, mean age 11 years and a group of older
children with learning disabilities, aged 18 years, but matched to
the low-IQ autism group on performance IQ, and the high-IQ aut-
ism group on VIQ. Shah and Frith (1993) conﬁrmed that, for both
autism groups, the BDT gave the peak performance of all the IQ
sub-tests in the appropriate section of theWechsler subscales, they
then looked at several different block designs, dividing the patterns
up into those with horizontal and vertical lines only and those withFig. 7. (a) The Block Design task. (b) Example from the Embedded Figures Test. Find
‘Understanding assets and deﬁcits in autism: why success is more interesting than failu
OpenLearn LabSpace (labspace.open.ac.uk).oblique lines only. These were presented both in the normal orien-
tation and at oblique orientations and ‘‘whole” (undivided) or ‘‘seg-
mented”, where the design is split into its constituent components,
thereby partially solving the task for the participant. The key result
was that the autism group performed better than controls only
when the block design was presented in its whole, unsegmented
form, suggesting that their superiority in the task was dependent
on a superior ability to break the original pattern down into sub-
patterns.
The Shah and Frith (1993) study has been supported in more re-
cent work by Happé (1994), Ruhl, Werner, and Poustka (1995), Sie-
gel, Minshew, and Goldstein (1996), Ehlers et al. (1997), Dennis
et al. (1999), Ropar and Mitchell (2001) and Spek, Scholte, and
van Berckelaer-Onnes (2008).
Caron, Mottron, Berthiaume, and Dawson (2006) divided both
their ASD and control groups into those with and without an indi-
vidual ‘‘Block Design Peak” in IQ test batteries (Siegel et al., 1996).
In their geographically localized sample, 47% of the ASD-diagnosed
population showed this peak, as compared with 2% of the typical
population. They also differentiated low and high ‘‘perceptual
coherence” (PC) block designs. In low PC designs, the block struc-
ture is obvious from the pattern structure due to the larger number
of intensity edges which align with block segmentation points; in
high PC designs, the contours from the blocks combine to make
elongated patterns that, in some cases, resemble grating patterns
(Royer & Weitzel, 1994). Caron et al.’s (2006) results were largely
similar to Shah and Frith’s (1993), but highlighted the importance
of perceptual coherence in unsegmented block patterns and the
potential role of block design ‘‘giftedness” in comparisons between
ASD and control populations. These issues may explain the failures
of Kaland, Mortensen, and Smith (2007) and Bölte et al. (2007) to
ﬁnd differences between high-functioning individuals with ASD
and IQ-matched controls.
Bölte, Hubl, Dierks, Holtmann, and Poustka (2008) used an
adaptation of the BDT to look at fMRI activations in a group of ado-
lescents and adults with ASD and controls with similar NVIQ. The
most signiﬁcant result was a reduction in the activation of V2v be-
tween ASD and control groups while performing the BDT, despite
equivalent behavioural performance. Bölte et al. (2008) interpreted
this reduced activation as evidence for a reduction in the formation
of visual contours in the ASD group.
In summary, the evidence seems to be quite strong that a pro-
portion of individuals on the autism spectrum will show superior,the triangle (‘‘tent”) inside the pram/stroller. Image taken from Happé, F. (1999)
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BDT, and that it is potentially solved in a different way. However,
this task involves a number of stages: segmenting the image,
choosing the correct blocks and then constructing them appropri-
ately, any of which stages could potentially present problems to
individuals with ASD, depending on the details of their symptoms.
Hence, in visual perception terms, the Block Design Task is proba-
bly not as informative as other more direct measurements of visual
performance.
8.3. Visual search
Both the Embedded Figures Task and the Block Design Task can
be regarded as forms of visual search. Plaisted, O’Riordan, and Bar-
on-Cohen (1998b) looked directly at two search tasks: in the ‘‘fea-
ture” search task, the target shared colour with one set of
distracters but was unique in shape; in the ‘‘conjunctive” search
task, the target shared colour with one set and shape with another
set of distracters. In all cases the stimulus micropatterns were let-
ters (X,T,S) and the colours used were red and green. Children with
autism (7–10 years) were compared with a typical control group
matched on VMA. Note that the children with autism had higher
SpatialMental Ages than the controls, as measured by the BDT. Un-
like the control children, the children with autism showed no sig-
niﬁcant slowing in reaction time in the conjunctive task compared
to the feature task and were, in fact, faster at ﬁnding the conjunc-
tive target than the controls. O’Riordan, Plaisted, Driver, and Baron-
Cohen (2001) conﬁrmed the Plaisted et al. (1998b) result using a
different control group, matched by non-verbal ability, and ex-
tended it to look at search asymmetries. RTs for ﬁnding a tilted line
in a background of vertical lines were similar for both autism and
control groups, but the autism group found the opposite task –
ﬁnding a vertical line in a background of tilted lines – signiﬁcantly
easier than matched controls. Other measurements of visual search
performance were consistent with the children with autism having
superior ability to matched controls on serial search tasks.
O’Riordan and Plaisted (2001) took this investigation even fur-
ther, using complex triple conjunction search tasks to argue that
the key factor in the superior performance of children with autism
on visual search tasks is their superior ability to discriminate tar-
gets and distracters (see also Plaisted, O’Riordan, & Baron-Cohen,
1998a). O’Riordan (2004) has extended this ﬁnding to adults on
the autism spectrum.Fig. 8. Visual search task from Caron et al. (2006). Note that pattern (b) has much hig
University Press.Jarrold et al. (2005) used a ‘‘difﬁcult” feature search task, where
the feature was quite similar to the distracters (e.g. a red X-shaped
clown amongst green T- and red O-shaped clowns) and a conjunc-
tion search task (e.g. the same red X-shaped clown amongst green
X-shaped and red T-shaped clowns). They found, similar to O’Rior-
dan et al. (2001), that visual search performance was better for
both feature and conjunction search in their group of children with
autism than in their developmental-age-matched control group.
Caron et al. (2006) used their population separation in terms of
BDT performance to look at visual search as well, using stimulus
micropatterns that resembled the bicolour blocks from the task
(see Fig. 8). They found that reaction times for both featural and
conjunction search, were faster for the individuals with Block De-
sign peaks, irrespective of diagnosis, than they were for those
without.
Rinehart, Bradshaw, Moss, Brereton, and Tonge (2008) recently
demonstrated that Inhibition of Return (IOR), another aspect of vi-
sual search, is intact in young people with autism and AS, and pos-
sibly even slightly superior to control performance.
Keehn, Brenner, Palmer, Lincoln, and Muller (2008) performed
an fMRI study of visual search performance with adolescents with
ASD and typical controls, matched on NVIQ. Despite only marginal
differences in search performance between the two groups the
BOLD activations in the ASD group were more extensive, recruiting
a network involving frontal, parietal and occipital cortices, whereas
activations in the typical group were more conﬁned to occipito-
temporal regions. Direct comparisons revealed greater activations
in occipital and frontal regions in the ASD group.
To summarise the data on visual search, the bulk of evidence
seems to favour superior performance from ASD groups to
matched controls, even in quite challenging multiple conjunction
searches, and the argument that this could be achieved due to en-
hanced discrimination of the micropattern elements is compelling
(O’Riordan & Plaisted, 2001; O’Riordan et al., 2001; but see Bott,
Brock, Brocdorff, Boucher, & Lamberts, 2006, for a dissenting voice).
8.4. Spatial visual attention
8.4.1. Visual orienting
The literature on overt and covert visual orienting to non-social
stimuli in ASD is highly contentious. Wainwright-Sharp and Bryson
(1993), Casey, Gordon, Mannheim, and Rumsey (1993), Courchesne
et al. (1994), Townsend, Courchesne, and Egaas (1996a), Town-her Perceptual Coherence than pattern (a). Reproduced with permission of Oxford
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ling, Rinaldi, and Brown (1998) have argued that visual orienting is
impaired in ASD. Wainwright and Brown (1996) and Harris, Cour-
chesne, Townsend, Carper, and Lord (1999) reported idiosyncratic
visual-spatial orienting performance, but Pascualvaca, Fantie,
Papageorgiu, and Mirsky (1998), Leekam, Lopez, and Moore
(2000), Iarocci and Burack (2004) and Senju et al. (2004) argued
that ASD populations do not have a deﬁcit in shifting attentional
focus. Renner, Klinger, and Klinger (2006) found impairments in
exogenous (reﬂexive), but not endogenous (voluntary) orienting
performance between their diagnostic groups.
Van der Geest, Kemner, Camfferman, Verbaten, and van Engel-
und (2001) directly measured attentional shifts using eye tracking.
They compared the performance of 16 children with HFA, aged 10–
11 years, with CA- and IQ-matched controls in the ‘‘gap-and-over-
lap” paradigm. This paradigm uses two phases: in the overlap
condition, the ﬁxation point is visible when the target is presented
(in another place); in the gap condition, nothing is visible at ﬁxa-
tion when the target is presented. Saccadic latencies to the target
are much shorter in the gap condition, and the difference is called
the ‘‘gap effect”. It is argued that the two conditions involve differ-
ent levels of attentional disengagement and hence can be used to
analyse the strength of these components to visual orienting
behaviour (Fischer & Weber, 1993). Van der Geest et al. (2001)
found that, although there were no signiﬁcant differences between
the autism group and controls in each condition individually, the
gap effect was smaller in the autism group, suggesting that chil-
dren with autism have lower levels of attentional engagement.
This result was replicated in a similar clinical population by Kawa-
kubo, Maekawa, Itoh, Hashimoto, and Iwanami (2004).
Goldstein, Johnson, and Minshew (2001) compared 103 care-
fully characterized individuals with ASD to the same number of
matched controls on a battery of tests of attentional processing
and performed a complex factor analysis of the results (Mirsky, An-
thony, Duncan, Ahearn, & Kellam, 1991). They argued from their
analyses that apparent deﬁcits in attention in ASD could be due
to deﬁcits in complex decision making, or in psychomotor abilities.
Greenaway and Plaisted (2005) used a different approach. They
compared top-down and bottom-up control using a combination of
cueing and visual search tasks employing task-irrelevant distrac-
tors. Their ASD group consisted of 31 children, aged 9.5–13.5 years,
and a similar number of typical controls, matched on NVIQ (Ra-
ven’s matrices). Two types of target were used, which they de-
scribe as ‘‘onset” (i.e. a single white symbol) or ‘‘colour” (i.e. a
red symbol among white symbols). They found that the perfor-
mance of the ASD group, in terms of top-down modulation, was
equivalent for the colour stimuli, but not for the onset stimuli.
They suggested that individuals with ASD have difﬁculty prioritiz-
ing dynamic stimuli, and linked this to a magnocellular pathway
processing deﬁcit (Greenaway & Plaisted, 2005).
Belmonte (2000) and Belmonte and Yurgelun-Todd (2003) have
looked at the neural basis of covert attention shifting in ASD, using
ERP and fMRI analysis, respectively. In both cases unusual activa-
tions were found in the ASD group. In particular, Belmonte and
Yurgelun-Todd (2003) found less frontal activation and more
occipital activation in the ASD group. Haist, Adamo, Westerﬁeld,
Courchesne, and Townsend (2005) also found this, at least for short
ISI attention tasks, but also reported hypo-activation of the cere-
bellum in either short or long ISI conditions. They suggested that
individuals with ASD show a profound deﬁcit in automatic spatial
attention ability and an abnormal voluntary attention ability.
8.5. Attention to spatial scale
A number of studies have suggested that global grouping pro-
cesses are deﬁcient in ASD due to the unusual performance inthe Navon task (Navon, 1977). In this task, a ﬁgure, such as a large
letter ‘S’, is built up from smaller ﬁgures, such as small letter ‘c’s.
Participants are asked to name either the small or the large letter.
Typical observers ﬁnd it easier to name the larger than the smaller
letter, and this is reﬂected in differential performance in the task
(the ‘‘global superiority effect”). Using Navon-type stimuli, some
studies have reported that participants with ASD tend to be more
sensitive to the local stimulus than controls (Rinehart Bradshaw,
Moss, Brereton, & Tonge, 2000, 2001 (autism only, not AS), Gross,
2005; Behrmann et al., 2006a), but others have not (Deruelle, Ron-
dan, Gepner, & Fagot, 2006; Edgin & Pennington, 2005; Mottron,
Burack, Iarocci, Belleville, & Enns, 2003; Mottron, Burack, Stauder,
& Robaey, 1999b; Ozonoff, Strayer, McMahon, & Filloux, 1994;
Rondan & Deruelle, 2007).
Further evidence for enhanced attention to local visual informa-
tion in ASD comes from Jarrold and Russell’s (1997) counting
experiment, where children with autism tended to count each
dot individually rather than rapidly and automatically enumerate
them (see also Gagnon, Mottron, Bherer, & Joanette, 2004; Mottron
et al., 1999a). Plaisted et al. (1999) suggested that the ﬁnding of lo-
cal precedence in children with autism depended on task instruc-
tions. Plaisted et al. (1999) used the Navon task and either told
the children whether the stimulus was at the local or global level
(selective attention task) or gave them no instructions (divided
attention task). They found that no global advantage (local prece-
dence) was found in the autism group in the divided attention task,
but that performance was the same as controls in the selective
attention task. These results suggested that switching the spatial
scale of attention was most problematic for the children with aut-
ism, and that the default state might well be set at a ﬁner scale
than that of typical children.
Other suggestions concerning the spatial spread of attention in
ASD, tested using a variety of tasks, have been that individuals with
ASD have difﬁculty inhibiting distractors (an ‘‘inefﬁcient atten-
tional lens”: Burack, 1994; contradicted by Ozonoff & Strayer,
1997), problems with broadening the spread of attention (Mann
& Walker, 2003), a ‘‘local bias” (Behrmann et al., 2006a), a ‘‘piece-
meal strategy of processing” (Iarocci, Burack, Shore, Mottron, &
Enns, 2006) or have no difﬁculties relative to controls (Plaisted, Do-
bler, Bell, & Davis, 2006).
Rondan and Deruelle (2007), in another variation on the Navon-
type task, looked at conﬁgurational matches versus local matches
in schematic face and non-face stimuli. Participants were given
the choice between matching a pattern with the same spatial con-
ﬁguration but different constituent shapes or the same shapes in a
slightly different conﬁguration. Adults with ASD favoured the local
shape match rather than the conﬁguration match, unlike the typi-
cal controls, these being the same adults with ASD who had shown
equivalent performance to the controls on a Navon-type task. Ron-
dan and Deruelle (2007) argue that conﬁgurational, rather than
global, processing is disrupted in ASD.
In an epic attempt at empirical and theoretical synthesis, Wang,
Mottron, Peng, Berthiaume, and Dawson (2007) presented an
exhaustive study of different Navon-type tasks with individuals
on the autism spectrum, varying such factors as response type,
exposure time and stimulus size. They interpreted their complex
pattern of results as evidence for atypical local-to-global interfer-
ence in ASD and local advantages in incongruent conditions, where
the local and global stimuli are unmatched. They also argued that
this local bias for visual processing potentially gives individuals on
the autism spectrum a ﬂexibility which is unavailable to typical
individuals and which may sometimes enhance and sometimes
diminish performance in visual tasks.
A ﬁnal spanner in the works of this confusing literature comes
from Rutherford et al. (2007b). They used the ‘‘Useful Field of
View” task, usually used to look at the spatial scope of attention
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ak, 2000), to assess the attentional span of adults with ASD (mean
age 25) under different amounts of central attentional load. This
task comprises a central letter-identiﬁcation task (focused-central)
with a peripheral task (focused-peripheral) which requires the par-
ticipant to choose the ‘‘spoke” of the ‘‘wheel” in which a ﬂashed
square was presented in a 4AFC. The ﬁnal task is a divided atten-
tion task in which both central and peripheral stimuli are pre-
sented at the same time and two responses are required. The
performance of the ASD group was broadly comparable to that of
the controls, but a difference was found in the ‘‘attentional cost”
of divided attention. Whereas performance of the ASD group in
the peripheral task was barely affected by the need to perform
the central task at the same time, the control group was signiﬁ-
cantly worse. Curiously, the ASD group seemed to be more strate-
gic than the controls in maintaining their attentional scope at an
intermediate level: good enough to do the central task and maxi-
mizing performance in the peripheral task. Rutherford et al.
(2007b) argue that this result is problematic to explain in terms
of current models of visual processing in ASD and also incompati-
ble with much of the previous literature on attention in ASD (e.g.
Plaisted et al., 1999).
8.6. Social attention
Social attention refers to the tendency for social stimuli – lar-
gely faces and people – to attract attention. This is obviously likely
to be an area of difﬁculty for people with ASD. Some of the material
relevant to this section has already been covered in the face and
attention sections above, so only speciﬁc studies on social atten-
tion will be mentioned here.
Swettenham et al. (1998) examined videotapes of children en-
gaged in a structured play situation. The children were very young
(about 20 months), being part of a study into the early diagnosis of
autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1996). They found that whereas the
control groups tended to focus most on people, shifting attention
mainly from objects to people, the autism group tended to shift
from objects to other objects. The autism group also spent less time
looking at people and more time looking at objects (see also Swet-
tenham et al., 2003; Willemsen-Swinkels, Buitelaar, Wejnen, & van
Engelund, 1998).
Probably the most famous study in this area is that of Klin
et al. (2002) who asked 15 men with HFA and typical controls
to view social scenes (extracts from the movie ‘‘Who’s Afraid of
Virginia Woolf”) whilst their eye movements were tracked. Upon
coding, the best predictor of autism was reduced eye-region ﬁxa-
tion time. Individuals who ﬁxated more on mouths than objects
tended to score higher in social functioning tests, whereas those
who focused more on objects showed the opposite tendency. Klin
et al. (2002) argued that, in natural social scenes, eyes are the
least salient stimulus for individuals with ASD, and mouths,
bodies and objects are relatively more salient. See also Jones
and Klin (2008).
Bird, Catmur, Silani, Frith, and Frith (2006) compared atten-
tional modulation to house and face stimuli in an fMRI study using
16 individuals with ASD and matched controls. Analysis showed
that responses to houses were modulated by attention in both
groups, but only the controls showed attentional modulation to
faces. An analysis of effective connectivity suggested that in the
ASD group there was a failure to modulate connectivity between
extrastriate areas and V1: which could result in a reduced salience
for social stimuli.
Fletcher-Watson, Leekam, Benson, Frank, and Findlay (2009)
presented adults with ASD with a complex social scene alongside
another non-social scene and measured eye movements during a
3-s viewing period. Their measurements indicated a ‘‘superﬁ-cially normal” attentional preference for social information in
the ASD group, but they also found some subtle abnormalities
which may be signiﬁcant in real-life scenarios. Riby and Hancock
(2008) have reported reduced attention to people and faces in
static pictures of social interactions, in contrast to their control
sample of individuals with Williams syndrome. See also Riby
and Hancock (2009a, 2009b) for supporting data using different
paradigms and stimuli.
The prevailing view on social attention is, then, that individuals
with ASD have difﬁculty with attending to people, particularly the
eye regions of faces, in a range of stimulus situations. However,
sometimes this difﬁculty is not readily apparent, especially in con-
trolled laboratory tests.8.7. Visual attention – summary
The literature on visual attention in ASD presents a confusing
picture. There is probably enough evidence to suggest that the pro-
cessing of information across spatial scales works differently in
ASD, but precisely how is too early to call. Individuals with ASD
also seem to have problems with attending to people in natural
animated scenes, but whether this is due to low-level visual factors
or higher-level motivational factors is still unclear.9. Oculomotor problems
Goldberg et al. (2002) looked at saccadic functioning in 11 indi-
viduals with HFA and typical controls, and using a number of stan-
dard paradigms (anti-saccade, memory-guided saccade, predicted
saccade and gap/overlap tasks). There were a number of differ-
ences between ASD and control performance on these tasks, which
suggested signiﬁcant abnormalities in oculomotor function. Gold-
berg et al. (2002) suggested that these abnormalities implicated
brain regions such as the dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex and the
frontal eye ﬁelds, as well as basal ganglia and parietal lobes as
being affected in ASD.
Takarae, Minshew, Luna, and Sweeney (2004) measured visu-
ally guided saccades in 46 individuals with HFA/AS and IQ-
matched controls. The ASD group was found to have increased
variability in saccade accuracy, together with mild saccadic hypo-
metria in those without delayed language development. Takarae
et al. (2004) suggested that this pattern of saccadic abnormality
was consistent with a chronic functional disturbance in the
cerebellar vermis or its output in the fastigial nuclei. Later results
suggested cerebellar or fronto-striatal circuitry atypicalities along
with extrastriate areas that extract visual motion information or
its transfer to sensorimotor areas (Takarae, Minshew, Luna, &
Sweeney, 2005a; Takarae, Minshew, & Sweeney, 2005b).
However, despite this evidence in favour of eye movement
abnormalities in ASD, Van der Geest, Kemner, Verbaten, and
van Engelund (2003) tested a variety of eye movement parame-
ters as well as attentional tasks in a group of children with aut-
ism and found that only the attention task showed group
differences.
Finally, Mottron et al. (2007) described atypical exploratory
behaviours towards inanimate objects among young children with
autism. The most frequent atypical behaviour amongst 15 children
with autism aged 33–73 months was ‘‘lateral glancing”, mostly to-
wards moving stimuli. This behaviour is described as ‘‘Fixating on a
target with the pupils turned toward an extreme corner of the eye
socket, where the head is turned in the opposite direction”.
Mottron et al. (2007) explain this behaviour as an attempt to
over-stimulate peripheral vision in order to regulate excessive
amounts of local detailed information.
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People with ASD often show strong reactions to changes in the
environment, suggesting that they may detect changes more efﬁ-
ciently than typically developing people. However, Fletcher-Wat-
son, Leekam, Turner, and Moxon (2006) reported no differences
in performance between adults with autism and typical adults in
a change-detection task. Burack et al. (2009) initially also found
no differences in change-detection performance between children
with autism and typical children matched in non-verbal MA, but
differences emerged when the detection failures were related to
the developmental level of the participants. Detection failures de-
creased with increasing developmental level for typical children,
but remained constant over the same developmental range for
children with autism, pointing to an atypical developmental trajec-
tory for change-detection among children with autism.11. Neuroimaging studies
This section covers neuroimaging data not already covered
above. Relevant reviews include DiCicco-Bloom et al. (2006) or
can be found in the collected volume Bauman and Kemper (2004).11.1. Neuroanatomy
The developmental neuroanatomy of autism has recently been
reviewed by Courchesne et al. (2007). The key feature in early
development seems to be early brain overgrowth, possibly due to
a failure of neural pruning, and consequent abnormalities in neural
patterning and wiring. This pattern would be extensive local inter-
connectivity at the expense of long-range connectivity, which
could clearly result in disruption of a number of critical neural cir-
cuits. See also McAlonan et al. (2005, 2008) and Hallahan et al.
(2009) for more detail on current neuranatomical ﬁndings.11.2. Electrophysiology
Atypical ERP and EEG responses to visual stimulation have been
found in a number of studies on ASD (see reviews by Dawson et al.,
2005; Kemner & van Engelund, 2006). These include abnormal spa-
tial frequency processing (Boeschoten et al., 2007; Milne et al.,
2009), and apparent functional under- and over-connectivity
(Murias, Webb, Greenson, & Dawson, 2007).11.3. Functional magnetic resonance imaging
Villalobos, Mizuno, Dahl, Kemmotsu, and Müller (2005) looked
at functional connectivity along the dorsal stream during visually
prompted button presses in a group of eight high-functioning
adults with ASD and matched controls. They found intact func-
tional connectivity in the ASD group between V1 and superior pari-
etal areas, suggesting that dorsal stream connectivity was intact.
There was, however, reduced functional connectivity between V1
and inferior frontal areas, which Villalobos et al. (2005) suggest
may be consistent with mirror-neuron system dysfunction. In con-
trast, however, Mizuno, Villalobos, Davies, Dahl, and Muller (2006)
found evidence for hyper-connectivity between thalamus and
cerebral cortex using BOLD signal cross-correlation. Further func-
tional connectivity abnormalities have been found between FFA
and amygdala during face processing (Kleinhans et al., 2008).
Hadjikhani et al. (2004a) mapped visual cortical areas in a group
of individuals with HFA, and found that early visual areas were or-
ganized as in typical controls, with typical ratios between central
and visual ﬁeld representations. They argue that any visual pro-cessing atypicalities in autism must come from higher-level visual
areas and be the result of top-down inﬂuences.12. Summary of visual processing studies
A considerable amount of data has been added to the ﬁeld since
the reviews of Dakin and Frith (2005) and Behrmann et al. (2006b),
particularly using faces as stimuli. However, most of these data are
contradictory, or at least contested, so it is very hard to say any-
thing with certainty. The new ﬁndings on colour vision difﬁculties
(Franklin et al., 2008, in press; Heaton et al., 2008) are interesting
and of theoretical importance, but await further replication with
better characterized ASD populations. The possibility that a visual
perception task might be able to distinguish individuals with aut-
ism from those with Asperger Syndrome is also exciting (Spencer &
O’Brien, 2006; Tsermentseli et al., 2008), but there are methodo-
logical and replication issues with these results as well. Another is-
sue for these studies is the likely disappearance of Asperger
Syndrome as a distinct diagnostic category in the upcoming
DSM-V. The difﬁculties for ASD participants with complex motion
stimuli, which seemed so clear cut a few years ago, are now much
more contentious, but local superiority effects in tasks such as vi-
sual search seem to be holding their own. The literature on face
processing and visual attention is still highly contentious. The bal-
ance is in favour of an attentional difﬁculty resulting in unusual
eye gaze, which then results in unusual visual experience and
development. The neuroimaging data indicates unusual patterns
of brain activations, particularly when eye movements are not con-
trolled, and there is a trend of ﬁnding higher activations at lower
levels of visual processing, consistent with the idea of some sort
of bottleneck in the processing pathway somewhere between pri-
mary visual cortex and higher visual areas. Difﬁculties with eye re-
gions of faces and low spatial frequencies are also fascinating, but
much work remains to be done. The issue of visual acuity should be
resolved following Ashwin et al. (2009), and no work has yet been
done on stereopsis. A really basic characterization of the visual
processing capabilities of people with ASD would be extremely
useful, even if all it could do was say with certainty ‘‘nothing is
wrong here”, as some have already suggested (e.g. Hadjikhani
et al., 2004a). However, our suspicion is that there are a number
of subtle differences between the visual processing capabilities of
ASD and typical populations which remain to be discovered. The
way forward must be for vision scientists, who know how to run
rigorous psychophysical experiments, to collaborate with those
of a more clinical orientation, who know how to characterize clin-
ical populations accurately.13. Theories of visual processing in ASDs
13.1. Cognitive theories
The dominant cognitive theories in ASD research have recently
been reviewed by Rajendran and Mitchell (2007). One of the most
inﬂuential ideas in the past 25 years has been the ‘‘Theory of
Mind” (ToM) hypothesis, championed by Simon Baron-Cohen
and colleagues at the University of Cambridge (Baron-Cohen,
1995; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). The theory focused on
explaining the poor performance of children with ASD on ‘‘false
belief” tasks, where participants are required to interpret a situa-
tion from the point of view of another, and argued that the cen-
tral deﬁcit in ASD was the ability (and possibly also motivation)
to ‘‘read” others’ minds in social situations. Frith (2003) prefers
to call this ability ‘‘mentalizing”. The ToM hypothesis did not
really have any speciﬁc predictions about visual processing in
ASD, other than a difﬁculty with interpreting facial expressions,
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on-Cohen et al., 1997b). Recently this theory has metamorphosed
into the ‘‘Extreme Male Brain” hypothesis (Baron-Cohen, 2002,
2003), which argues that ASD is characterized by poor ‘‘empathiz-
ing” and high ‘‘systemizing”. Empathizing is related to Theory of
Mind in that it involves interpreting the feelings of others, but
adds that feelings must not only be interpreted, but also experi-
enced by the viewer. Systemizing, on the other hand, is the ability
to analyse rule-based systems and is a trait associated with math-
ematical, engineering and scientiﬁc ability. In visual processing
terms, again, the implications of this theory are not direct, but
if people with ASD are poor empathizers and good systemizers,
one might expect a deﬁcit in the recognition and interpretation
of complex facial expressions and possibly also a skill in visual
analysis of the components of complex images. This latter skill,
however, is possibly more associated with an alternative theoret-
ical account of ASD: the ‘‘Weak Coherence” account (WC; Frith,
1989; Happé & Frith, 2006).
Frith’s (1989) original formulation of weak coherence (origi-
nally called ‘‘weak central coherence”) was built on the observa-
tion of local processing biases in ASD populations, combined
with the relative failure to extract the gist or meaning of events
in everyday life. The account was supported by the original obser-
vations in ASD populations of superior disembedding performance
in the Embedded Figures Task (Shah & Frith, 1983), superior per-
formance in the Block Design Task (Shah & Frith, 1993) and re-
duced sensitivity to visual illusions (Happé, 1996). However,
Happé and Frith (2006) have now reformulated the account in
three important ways in response to other empirical ﬁndings: (1)
it is no longer regarded as a ‘‘core deﬁcit in central processing” in
ASD, but as a more secondary outcome characterized by a local
or detail-focused processing style; (2) this processing style can
be overcome in some situations; (3) it is one aspect of a more de-
tailed cognitive proﬁle which includes problems with Theory of
Mind.
The ﬁnal dominant cognitive theory of ASD has been the ‘‘Exec-
utive Dysfunction” account (Hill, 2004, 2008; Ozonoff et al., 1991;
Russell, 1997). This theory focuses on the difﬁculties that individ-
uals with ASD have with tasks involving planning, mental ﬂexibil-
ity, generativity, inhibition and multi-tasking (Hill, 2008). The
original motivation behind the theory was to account for the
non-social symptoms, such as repetitive and obsessional behav-
iours, which were not well explained by ToM or WC accounts.
Again, there are few precise predictions about visual performance
that come from the Executive Dysfunction theories, although difﬁ-
culties with visual attention (especially attentional disengagement
and divided attention), scene exploration and eye-movements
might be expected.
13.2. Neural theories
One approach to understanding the neural basis of ASD is to
compare its signs and symptoms with those of conditions and syn-
dromes of known neurological origin. This approach has led to sug-
gestions of pathology in a large number of brain areas in ASD,
including the cerebellum (Courchesne, 1997), the temporal lobes,
especially the STS and the FFA (Zilbovicius et al., 2006), the amyg-
dala (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Howard et al., 2000) and the frontal
lobes (Courchesne & Pierce, 2005). Recent attempts at synthesis
have attempted to map the triad of impairments which is thought
to characterize autism onto speciﬁc brain regions (Baron-Cohen &
Belmonte, 2005; Frith, 2003). This has led to the idea of ‘‘social
brain” dysfunction in ASD: a network of brain regions which in-
cludes the Superior Temporal Sulcus, Superior Temporal Gyrus,
Inferior Occipital Gyrus and Fusiform Gyrus in the occipital and
temporal lobes with the Amygdala and Medial Pre-frontal Cortex,Anterior Cingulate Cortex and Orbitofrontal Cortex (see Fig. 9).
These areas seem to safely cover functions such as poor facial
expression recognition, difﬁculties with interpreting eye gaze,
problems with integrating sensory information and executive
function problems.
What, however, could cause the (unspeciﬁed) neuropathology
in these brain regions? Recently, Baron-Cohen and co-workers
have suggested that the difﬁculty lies with abnormalities in the
levels of the hormone testosterone in the mother’s womb, which
causes neural developmental abnormalities (Baron-Cohen, 2006).
Other ideas at the neural level, in no particular order, include
the absence of ‘‘top-down” neural control (Frith, 2003), malfunc-
tioning social reward mechanisms based around the amygdala
(Schultz, 2005), neural connectivity abnormalities (Belmonte
et al., 2004; Minshew & Williams, 2007; Rippon, Brock, Brown, &
Boucher, 2007), abnormal cortical ‘‘minicolumns” (Casanova, Bux-
hoeveden, Switala, & Roy, 2002), abnormal neural synchronization
(Brock, Brown, Boucher, & Rippon, 2002), imbalance of excitation
and inhibition (Rubenstein & Merzenich, 2003) and imbalanced
spectrally timed adaptive resonance (Grossberg & Seidman, 2006).
There has also been a ﬂurry of interest in the ‘‘Mirror neuron
hypothesis” of autism, which suggests that the symptoms of aut-
ism are related to dysfunctions in the so-called mirror-neuron sys-
tem. Key papers on this topic, in chronological order, are: Williams,
Whiten, Suddendorf, and Perrett (2001), Oberman et al. (2005),
Dapretto et al. (2006), Iacaboni and Dapretto (2006), Oberman,
Ramachandran, and Pineda (2008), Southgate and Hamilton
(2008), Oberman and Ramachandran (2008).
With this bewildering, and ever growing, variety of hypotheses
about the neural basis of autism, it is difﬁcult, and way beyond the
scope of this review, to try to map each of them onto speciﬁc pre-
dictions about visual processing. Obviously some of these theories
have been developed with particular behavioural results in mind,
such as superior disembedding performance and it relation to
weak coherence which inspires the top-down control hypothesis
of Frith (2003), whereas others have emerged almost entirely from
studies at the neuroanatomical level (e.g. Casanova et al., 2002).
However, there are three key ideas which have inspired much of
the recent behavioural work on ASD which do need further treat-
ment here.
13.2.1. Dorsal stream vulnerability
The ‘‘dorsal stream vulnerability” hypothesis (Atkinson & Brad-
dick, 2005; Braddick et al., 2003; Spencer et al., 2000) is based on
the differential performance in form and motion coherence tasks
observed in many neurodevelopmental disorders, including hemi-
plegia, Fragile-X syndrome, dyslexia and Williams syndrome, as
well as autism, suggesting that the neural mechanisms supporting
global motion sensitivity are particularly susceptible to damage,
possibly because of the more stringent neural timing requirements
of this pathway (Atkinson & Braddick, 2005). This theory is not
really intended to explain autism, particularly as the vulnerability
is not thought to be disorder-speciﬁc, but rather describes a poten-
tial consequence of developmental disability which may be linked
back to underlying neuropathological causes.
We have shown in the section on motion perception in ASD
that there is no strong evidence for a low-level motion/temporal
frequency processing deﬁcit in ASD, that the data on motion
coherence is somewhat equivocal and that biological motion is
probably affected adversely. These data do not therefore make a
strong case for a dorsal pathway problem. As for form processing,
Spencer and O’Brien (2006) and Tsermentseli et al. (2008) have
found an interesting deﬁcit in autism, but not in Asperger Syn-
drome. Whilst we have made clear that there are potential prob-
lems with the stimuli in these experiments it is hard to see how
these problems would cause the pattern of results found. How-
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basis for which must surely involve parvo- and koniocellular
pathways and the ventral stream, suggest that it is unlikely that
the neuropathology in ASD is conﬁned to the dorsal stream, un-
less there are some complicated interactive effects between the
two pathways.13.2.2. Enhanced perceptual functioning (EPF)
Enhanced perceptual functioning theory (Mottron & Burack,
2001; Mottron et al., 2006) has been increasingly inﬂuential in re-
cent years as the focus on perceptual processing in ASD has
grown. The theory is similar in many ways to Weak Coherence
(Frith, 1989; Happé & Frith, 2006) and also shares much with Pla-
isted’s (2001) reduced generalization theory, but its origins are
different.
The original theory states that a key aspect of ASD is a height-
ened response to sensory stimulation in the neural mechanisms
of perception from early in childhood (Mottron & Burack, 2001).
This heightened response leads to an attentional focus on low-level
sensory phenomena, at the expense of social interaction, and a
consequent atypical wiring of the brain during development. Mot-
tron and Burack (2001) name four areas of neural development
where this manifests itself: growth of neuronal connections, re-
dedication of cortical areas, suppression of inhibition and ‘‘func-
tional persistence”, meaning the excessive reﬁnement of low-level
processes at the expense of higher level processes. The inspiration
for this theory came from Mottron’s and Burack’s work with
‘‘savants” on the autism spectrum, particularly those with en-
hanced graphical abilities (e.g. Mottron & Belleville, 1993) and
has been supported by empirical data emerging from the Mon-Fig. 9. The social brain. Reproduced with permission from thetreal-based labs of Mottron, Burack and their co-workers (e.g. Ber-
tone et al., 2003, 2005).
In the later update to this model (Mottron et al., 2006), eight
‘‘principles of autistic perception” are enumerated, with support-
ing evidence:
[1] The default setting of perception in individuals with autism
is more locally oriented than that of typical individuals.
[2] Increased gradient of neural complexity is inversely related
to level of performance in low-level tasks.
[3] Early atypical behaviours have a regulatory function toward
perceptual input.
[4] Perceptual primary and associative brain regions are atypi-
cally activated during social and non-social tasks.
[5] Higher-order processing is optional in autism and manda-
tory in typicals.
[6] Perceptual expertise underlies savant syndrome.
[7] Savant syndrome provides a model for subtyping Pervasive
Developmental Disorders.
[8] Enhanced functioning of primary perceptual brain regions
may account for the perceptual atypicalities in autism.
This is something of a ‘‘broad brush” theory, but there are
plenty of ideas in it for the vision scientist to consider. Given the
recency of the publication of this updated theory, it is largely con-
sistent with current literature on perception in ASD and there has
not been much time for it to be put to the test. Mottron et al.
(2006) were careful to distinguish the updated EPF theory from
its competitors and pre-cursors. They argue that it differs from
the Weak (Central) Coherence account in that it is couched in
terms of superior rather than inferior performance and that it isAnnual Review of Neuroscience (www.annualreviews.org).
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mandatory requirement. There is overlap with Plaisted’s (2001)
reduced generalization theory but EPF’s scope is more comprehen-
sive. Mottron et al. (2006) also borrowed the idea of the impor-
tance of informational complexity from Minshew, Goldstein, and
Siegel (1997) but mapped it onto the ‘‘negative” symptoms of
ASD: the expected asymmetry therefore is between superior per-
formance on ‘‘simple” tasks (e.g. grating detection, Bertone et al.,
2005) and inferior performance on ‘‘complex” tasks (e.g. second-
order motion, Bertone et al., 2003).
One potential problem with the EPF theory reported here
though is the suggestion of reduced ability of ASD populations in
chromatic discrimination (Franklin et al., 2008, in press; Heaton
et al., 2008). For example, the colour discrimination experiment
used by Franklin et al. (in press) is what most vision scientists
would call a low-level task, so why is the perception of colour dif-
ference not enhanced? Explaining these data within the restric-
tions of EPF theory is therefore a challenge, assuming that
Franklin et al.’s (in press) result is replicable. Another signiﬁcant
challenge within the context of vision science is deﬁning what is
‘‘simple” and what is ‘‘complex”, although that is potentially a
more tractable problem (see Bertone & Faubert, 2006).
However, there is another challenge for the EPF model: what
exactly is the neuropathology that underlies it? We have recently
suggested an explanation for the empirical data on visual process-
ing in ASDs which may have an answer (Simmons et al., 2007). We
shall sketch the theory here, although a full version is in prepara-
tion (see also Simmons et al., 2008).
13.2.3. Neural noise and autism spectrum disorders
One of the most surprising aspects of the sensory symptoms
of ASD is that individuals often report both hyper- and hypo-
sensitivities within the same sense modality (Baranek et al.,
2006; Bogdashina, 2003). We were also fascinated with the result
of Bertone et al. (2005) (see Fig. 1), suggesting that children with
ASD showed a (small) performance enhancement for ﬁrst-order
contrast detection in noise, but a performance decrement for
second-order contrast detection. Another observation was the
large variability reported in threshold data from ASD populations,
relative to both typical and developmentally delayed populations.
Whilst this could obviously be due to the inherent diagnostic
variability even within the different shades of the autism spec-
trum, we wondered whether there was a more concrete cause.
Adding noise to a ﬁxed signal intuitively involves a decrease in
signal/noise ratio and therefore makes detectability worse. How-
ever, the phenomenon of stochastic resonance can amplify the sig-
nal/noise ratio under appropriate circumstances (i.e. a non-linear
systemwith a ﬁxed threshold, Wiesenfeld & Moss, 1995). This idea,
a controversial one in vision science, has recently been used suc-
cessfully to model contrast discrimination data (Goris, Wagemans,
& Wichmann, 2008b; Goris, Zaenen, & Wagemans, 2008a). The
detectability advantage for ﬁrst-order luminance-deﬁned gratings
in noise, therefore, could be due to increased internal noise in
the visual system of the ASD participants amplifying the signal
slightly via stochastic resonance. The poorer performance with sec-
ond-order gratings, on the other hand, comes because extracting
this signal involves combining information across more visual ﬁl-
ters, thereby increasing the noise level beyond the point where sto-
chastic resonance can help (Schoﬁeld & Georgeson, 1999).
Could this explanation apply to other data reported in this re-
view? Dakin and Frith (2005) already suggested that increased lev-
els of local motion noise could be a factor in explaining the data on
motion coherence in ASD. Our analysis has shown that a likely
cause of the discrepancies in these data is an increased level of cor-
respondence noise in the ASD populations who have difﬁculty with
seeing the motion, and preliminary data from our laboratory sug-gest that increased internal noise may be measurable in partici-
pants with ASD using equivalent noise analysis, similar to that
used by Dakin, Mareschal, and Bex (2005) (Simmons et al., 2007),
and that adding noise to biological motion stimuli can be highly
disruptive to ASD participants (McKay, Mackie, Piggott, Simmons,
& Pollick, 2006).
A further aspect, which is highly speculative, of the explanatory
power of an internal noise model for ASD concerns the colour dis-
crimination data of Franklin et al. (in press). Human colour vision
involves cone opponency, and it is well known that subtracting
noisy signals results in a decrease in signal/noise ratio unless the
noise is correlated. It is plausible, therefore, that the beneﬁts of sto-
chastic resonance for detection in ASD will only be found for ach-
romatic, and not chromatic judgements.
Added noise in the internal representations of faces could make
the identities of new faces harder to learn, subtle facial expressions
harder to distinguish and the eye regions of faces less distinct and
salient. Other visual perceptual data, such as superior performance
in the Embedded Figures and Block Design Tasks, are harder to ex-
plain, but we have already pointed out that these are relatively
‘‘high-level” tasks into which a number of component atypicalities
could feed. However, a combination of stochastic resonance ampli-
fying local differences andmasking hiding global differences would
seem to have considerable explanatory mileage in the context of
the visual search data at least.
Where could this noise come from? A number of the neural
models cited above suggest that there is a proliferation of neural
connections in the sensory cortex of individuals with ASD (Bel-
monte et al., 2004; Casanova et al., 2002; see Baron-Cohen & Bel-
monte, 2005; Minshew et al., 2007, for reviews), so neural
crosstalk within the cortex is one plausible mechanism. However,
recent investigations into the genetic basis of ASD have suggested
that glutamergic and GABA-ergic synapses could be affected (see
Garber, 2007; Persico & Bourgeron, 2006). Mis-ﬁring synapses
could easily result in noisy signals in the visual system.
Whilst it might seem somewhat brazen to add another theory
to the already theory-rich ﬁeld of autism research, we would argue
that the neural noise model has considerable explanatory power
and is parsimonious, but ﬂexible enough to account for a wide vari-
ety of phenomena in the literature on vision and ASD, and may
well have broader implications for understanding the condition
as a whole. The other advantage is that this theory is readily test-
able using established vision science paradigms such as equivalent
noise analysis and is physiologically plausible. Other studies that
have suggested that neural noise is involved in ASD include:
Rubenstein and Merzenich (2003), Belmonte and Yugelun-Todd
(2003), Dakin and Frith (2005), Thornton (2006), Sanchez-Marin
and Padina-Marilla (2008), Alcantara (2008), Lugo, Doti, and Fau-
bert (2008) and Franklin et al. (in press).
13.3. A ﬁnal challenge
Arguably the key theoretical battleground in ASD research at
the moment lies between those who favour a ‘‘social orienting”
theory of ASD development (e.g. Schultz, 2005) and those who fa-
vour a more bottom-up theory (e.g. Mottron et al., 2006). In other
words, is the information coming in corrupted and therefore caus-
ing the problems that manifest themselves as ASD, or is veridical
input information corrupted higher up in the brain circuits associ-
ated with the social brain, the mirror-neuron system, or the exec-
utive function system in the frontal lobes? As often, the truth
probably lies in a compromise between bottom-up and top-down
mechanisms, as top-down feedback undoubtedly has a role to play.
There are two further questions which emerge from this review.
What does ‘‘social” mean? Does it mean anything to do with a hu-
man being, or possibly animal, such that faces, voices, bodies etc.
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non-social? Or is social just another word for complex or unpre-
dictable? If so, what is the critical level of complexity/unpredict-
ability and how can this be quantiﬁed?
The second is more prosaic. What is the best way to engage ASD
populations in research? One of the curses in this ﬁeld is the size of
the error bars, which always seem to be at least twice as large in
the ASD data compared to the controls. Is this just unavoidable
or are there effective ways of splitting the ASD population? We
have seen that diagnostic measures (Asperger vs. autism), or per-
formance measures (Block Design peaks, Famous face recognition,
Verbal IQ) can be useful here (see also Happé et al., 2006), but obvi-
ously this technique increases the problem of participant recruit-
ment. These will be further complicated by the imminent
updates to diagnostic criteria planned for DSM-V.
A ﬁnal thing to remember is that the ultimate goal of our re-
search should be to help individuals with ASD to achieve their
own goals more effectively.14. Conclusion
In the 4 years or so since the publication of the Dakin and Frith’s
(2005) wryly titled review ‘‘Vagaries of visual perception in
autism” a great deal of data has been produced, and the theoretical
landscape of vision research in ASD has changed somewhat, with
the even greater inﬂuence of neuroimaging techniques. However,
some of the most interesting developments have come from old-
fashioned psychophysics and it is probably the case that we need
more of these before we can progress much further with the brain
imaging.
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